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INTRODUCTION

IRECT2 jurisdiction over individuals,' along with responsibilities to
them, will be the outstanding characteristics of the new Internal.See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc.

A/CONF. 183/9, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries

on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998, as corrected by the proces-verbauxof 10 Nov. 1998 and 12 July 1999, art. 1 [hereinafter ICC
Statute] (discussing jurisdiction over persons); see also id. art. 25(1) (explaining
that Court's jurisdiction is limited to natural persons); see also Paul C. Szasz, The
Security Council Starts Legislating,96 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 902 (2002) (characterizing
legislative acts of Security Council as decision that all States shall "take certain
actions against financing of terrorist activities, as well as miscellany of other actions
designed to prevent any support for terrorists and terrorist activities").
2. There are at least five types of responsibilities of the ICC to individuals in
the ICC Statute, some of which are novel in the system of international law and
international organizations. First, the Court is required to protect an expanded set
of procedural rights of those being tried. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts.
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tional Criminal Court (ICC or Court), as they already are of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for
Rwanda (ICTR). The ICC will be able to issue warrants for individuals'
arrest, obtain their presence at its seat, try them and order them punished.3 In the standard terminology of international law, the ICC, like the
55, 67 (listing rights afforded to persons during investigations including, among
other things, right to counsel, right against compelled self-incrimination and right
against cruel punishment).
Second, the ICC Statute protects substantive and equal protection rights of
accused persons before the Court. See id. art. 21(3). Under this provision, the
Court must enforce internationally recognized human rights in applying the criminal law. See id. The Court is also prohibited from making adverse distinctions
among persons on such bases as race, gender, religion, political opinion or national, ethnic or social origin. See id.
Third, the protection of the accused is extended to allow monetary remedies
against the ICC. In some cases, individuals wrongly imprisoned or convicted may
be awarded monetary damages for these wrongs. See id. art. 85 (providing that
damages are appropriate when conviction has been reversed due to newly discovered evidence).
Fourth, not only the accused, but victims and witnesses are protected in the
procedures of the Court as well. See, e.g., id. art. 68 (providing specific procedures
for victim and witness protection such as limited guarantees of confidentiality).
The statute also establishes a separate office, a Victims and Witnesses Unit, to protect their interests. See id. art. 43(6) (explaining duties of ICC Registry).
Fifth, the ICC Statute establishes a system of monetary restitution for victims
of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. See id. arts. 75, 79 (extending power
to Court to determine scope and extent of damage, loss or injury). Some restitution is provided directly from the assets of convicted persons. See id. art. 75 (noting
that Court may take account of representations on behalf of convicted person
before making order). Other restitution is planned from a Trust Fund. See id. art.
79 (stating that Fund shall be established to benefit victims of crimes within jurisdiction of Court); see, e.g., CHRISTOPH J.M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 330-31 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (presenting arguments justifying responsibility of ICC to observe human rights of individuals); see also Kenneth S. Gallant, Individual Human Rights in a New International Organization: The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(ENFORCEMENT) 693 (M.C. Bassiouni ed., Transnat'l Publishers 2d ed. 1999) (discussing individual human rights in ICC Statute).
3. See generally ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5, 6, 7, 10 (discussing investigation and prosecution, describing trials and discussing enforcement); see also
Shuichi Furuya, Legal Effect of Rules of the International Criminal Tribunals and Court
Upon Individuals: Emerging InternationalLaw of Direct Effect, 47 NETH. INT'L L. REV.
111, 120-29 (2000) (discussing different ways international law may create individual duties and ways it is actually accomplished in ICC Statute, and Statutes of International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda).
The Court will also have limited jurisdiction over States in the course of investigations and prosecutions. States will have international responsibilities inder Article 9 of the Statute to cooperate with the Court in the investigation and
prosecution of cases or to carry out orders and execute warrants of the Court. In
some instances, the Court may be able to operate in the territory of a State without
the consent of the State. See id. at 122-24. For example, the Pre-Trial Chamber
may

"[a]uthorize the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within the
territory of a State Party without having secured the cooperation of the
State under Part 9, if, whenever possible having regard to the views of the
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current ad hoc international criminal tribunals, will have 'jurisdiction to
adjudicate" allegations of crimes committed by individuals. The ICC and
the ad hoc tribunals also have legal obligations to ensure that they have
personal jurisdiction over those they seek to punish, and that they respect
the rights of the accused and the rights of others. 4 In some cases, the ICC
Statute supports the obligations of the Court with remedies that are availa5
ble as a matter of law to individuals.
As a consequence, individuals will have legal personality vis d vis this
international organization. While this is unusual in the law of international organizations, much of the legal form in which this personality is
expressed is not. In particular, many of the notions defining jurisdiction
to adjudicate over the person of an accused-personal jurisdiction-in
the Statute are familiar to most criminal lawyers in either the civil law or
common law systems, and to lawyers who have dealt with transnational or
international crime in national courts.
Jurisdiction over persons in international criminal law has recently reemerged as a vital issue. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) raised
the issue in its judgment in the recent Arrest Warrant case, and several
judges rendered opinions concerning the issue of universal personal jurisdiction for internationally recognized crimes. 6 Both the judgment and
the separate opinions considered the special status of international criminal tribunals, though the ICJ did not reach a definitive conclusion on universal jurisdiction in either international or national courts. Moreover,
the problem of accused al Qaeda and Taliban members raises issues of the
criminal jurisdiction of various types of national tribunal. Some commenState concerned, the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined in that case that
the State is clearly unable to execute a request for cooperation [for specified reasons]."
ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 57(3) (d). The author discusses the issue ofjurisdiction of the Court over States in Kenneth S. Gallant, The InternationalCriminalCourt
in the System of States and InternationalOrganizations,in 2 EssAys ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 52 (Flavia Lattanzi & William Schabas
eds., il Sirente forthcoming 2003), reprinted in a revised version LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
(forthcoming 2003). The Court's jurisdiction over States does not include the authority to find a State criminally or otherwise liable for international human rights
violations. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
4. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 19(1), (2) (a) (describing challenges to
jurisdiction by accused or person sought to be summoned or arrested); id. art.
21(3) (explaining that application of law is pursuant to internationally recognized
human rights); id. art. 55 (discussing rights of persons during investigation); id.
art. 57(3)(c) (describing protection and privacy of victims and witnesses); id. arts.
66-67 (discussing rights of accused at trial including presumption of innocence);
see also Furuya, supra note 3, at 144-45 (discussing how international law can directly create rights, as well as responsibilities, for individuals in court).
5. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 85 (listing remedies for wrongfully arrested, detained or convicted persons).
6. See generally Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant], availableat
http://www.icj-cij.org.
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tators are suggesting an international tribunal as a way to avoid these
7
problems.
These new developments require a reevaluation ofjurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate, and how they work in the context of
international criminal tribunals, especially how they are supposed to work
in the newly created ICC. This Article will suggest an evolutionary view
that does not discard the traditional views of these jurisdictions.
The identity of the lawmaker in international criminal tribunals is one
item that needs further examination. One new commentary begins, "It is
the international community of nations that determines which crimes fall
within this definition [of international crime] in light of the latest developments in law, morality, and the sense of criminal justice at the relevant
time."8 This Article will examine the extent to which this is true, and the
ways in which the international community is a criminal lawmaker. These
are more various than normally assumed in traditional doctrines of jurisdiction to prescribe, largely because these traditional doctrines deal with
cases in which only States are perceived as having such jurisdiction. This
Article will also suggest that the general assumption of universal jurisdiction to adjudicate in the ICC is an overstatement that can be damaging to
international human rights discourse and to support for the Court.
This Article is predominantly an analysis of issues of criminal jurisdiction over persons as they are treated in the ICC Statute, as well as in the
current ad hoc international criminal tribunals. Part II discusses the
sources of international criminal tribunals' jurisdiction to prescribe from
the end of World War II through the proposal of the ICC Statute. Part III
describes the limited jurisdiction to adjudicate over individuals in the
ICTY and ICTR. Part IV discusses the ICC Statute's general statement of
and limits on jurisdiction to adjudicate over individuals. The subsequent
Parts examine personal jurisdiction in the three classes of cases, defined
by the manner in which a situation comes before the ICC, as set out in the
ICC Statute. Part V addresses two of these, jurisdiction to adjudicate
where a situation is referred to the Court by a State or where an investigation is initiated by the prosecutor proprio motu. Part VI addresses personal
jurisdiction in situations referred to the ICC by the United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council. These latter two Parts necessarily address jurisdiction to
prescribe criminal law, as well as jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations of
crime, because situations covered by the ICC Statute may involve nationals
of States not parties to the ICC Statute, that have not accepted the Court's
jurisdiction.
7. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Judging the 11 September Terrorist Attack, 24 HUM.
RTs. Q. 323, 341-51 (2002). Because the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court is not retroactive, the Court cannot address previous crimes. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 11 (1) ("The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to
crimes committed after the entry into force of this statute.").
8. KRIANGSAK KIIrCIIAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2001) (defining international crime).
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Some of this discussion involves hypotheticals, which may or may not

actually arise under the ICC regime-specifically some crimes named in
the ICC Statute are not customary international crimes, and some situations the Court considers may involve persons without relevant jurisdictional connections to any U.N. Member State. 9 These possibilities are
worth discussing because they will demonstrate how the ICC Statute both
fits into, and seeks to modify, the regime of international law. The issue of
non-membership in the U.N. is of theoretical interest. It is also important
because genocide and other terrible crimes might follow the breakup of a
current State into new States that do not recognize the U.N. Charter, and
because, as long as there are any States outside the U.N., an accused might
seek refuge there or hide assets there.
This examination will demonstrate that human rights considerations
underlie matters as technical as personal jurisdiction in international
criminal justice. It will show how human rights law (particularly the rule
of nulla crimen sine lege) and the law of treaties and international organizations together may provide small but significant limitations on the universality ofjurisdiction to adjudicate in the ICC. This law provides analogous
limits on the universality ofjurisdiction to prescribe in the Security Council acting under its Chapter VII authority to restore and maintain peace
and security when it refers situations to the Court. Recognizing and respecting these limitations may well strengthen support for universal (or
10
near universal) jurisdiction in cases not covered by these limitations.
9. Non-U.N. Member States include Switzerland, which has signed and is in
the process of ratifying the ICC Statute (it has recently held a plebiscite in which
the people voted to join the U.N. and may have become a member by the time of
publication), and the following States that have not signed: Cook Islands, Niue and
the State of Vatican City. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is in an ambiguous
position, as both it and the People's Republic of China assert that there is a single
State of China, and the People's Republic replaced the Republic in the U.N. The
Occupied Territories of Palestine did not at the time of this Article appear to be
part of any U.N. Member State. However, the Palestinian Authority has a relationship with the U.N., and Israel, the occupying power in Palestine, is a Member
State.
10. But see Leila N. Sadat & S.R. Carden, The New InternationalCriminal Court:
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 397403 (2000) (summarizing proposed
structure of Court). Sadat & Carden's article formed the basis of part of the new
book, LEILA N. SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Transnat'l Publishers 2002). Sadat & Carden argue that the U.N. Charter creates a "constitution"
for the international community that cannot be ignored by non-Party States and
that the ICC Statute "is clearly intended to have the status of custom and even of
jus cogens obligations." Id. at 409-10 n.167 (when referral to court is made by Security Council, ICC Statute may apply to entire world). For further discussion of
this matter, see infra notes 135-40 and notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
Despite this disagreement, the author has been heavily influenced by this
piece, as well as by an earlier article by one of the authors, Leila Sadat [Wexler], A
First Look at the 1998 Rome Statute for a Permanent InternationalCriminal Court:Jurisdiction, Definition of Crimes, Structure and Referrals to the Court, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (ENFORCEMENT) 655 (M.C. Bassiouni ed., Transnat'l Publishers 2d ed.
1999). Professor Sadat also deserves credit as one of the key members of Professor
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Although it necessarily focuses on the new International Criminal
Court, this Article addresses limits of jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate in international criminal courts more generally. The new Court may
not replace all other international criminal tribunals. Certainly it is designed to eliminate the need for new international ad hoc tribunals such as
those for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.
Joint international-national tribunals including that recently created
for Sierra Leone,'I are in a different category. Such joint projects have
the goal of building judicial capacity in an area affected by widespread
violence, as well as bringing to justice those who have committed violations of international humanitarian law. If this type of experiment works,
these joint courts may continue to be created. Additionally, the ICC will
not have as much jurisdiction as some States would like it to have. Some
States from the Caribbean region would have liked the ICC to address
international drug trafficking and related money laundering, but the
Rome Conference did not include these crimes in the ICC's jurisdiction.
It is possible that at some point in the future a regional court will be created to deal with these crimes.

II.

THE IDENTITY OF THE LAWMAKER IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS

This Article addresses the issue ofjurisdiction over persons to adjudicate claims that they have violated international criminal law, as stated in
the ICC Statute and the organic documents of other international criminal tribunals. Almost of necessity this concerns the "legislative" authority
by which international criminal law is made-the jurisdiction of some entity to prescribe the law under which those prosecutions are brought.
Without a legitimate authority to define international criminal law, or to
apply law defined by a legitimate source, the ICC and other international
criminal tribunals would have no legitimate authority to adjudicate claims
of violations against individuals.
International law traditionally divides the subject of jurisdiction over
the person into jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce.' 2 This Article will address the first two types of
jurisdiction.
Bassiouni's drafting team in the period leading up to and including the Rome
Conference, which finalized the ICC Statute.
11. See Agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, opened for signature 16 Jan.
2002; see also Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 Jan. 2002, S.C. Res.
1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000) [hereinafter Special Court Statute].
12. See generally Sadat & Carden, supra note 10, at 406 n.144 (relying on RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 401).
Sometimes the phrase "legislative jurisdiction" is used instead of 'Jurisdiction to
prescribe." See Kenneth C. Randall, UniversalJurisdictionunder InternationalLaw, 66
TEX. L. REV. 785, 786 (1988) (using phrase "legislative jurisdiction" to describe
state's authority to make its law applicable to certain areas); see also Michael
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Jurisdiction to prescribe is jurisdiction to legislate, or to make rules of
law-in the cases discussed here, criminal law-which apply to persons,
whether natural or legal. Jurisdiction to adjudicate is jurisdiction to use
adjudicatory processes over a person to determine whether that person
has committed a crime.1 " The intellectual link between the two aspects of
criminal jurisdiction is very close, as shown by this prominent formulation
of jurisdiction to adjudicate in national courts: "A state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to enforce its criminal laws that punish universal
crimes and other non-territorial offenses within the state's jurisdiction to
prescribe."' 4 In other words, in national law, jurisdiction to adjudicate
5
allegations of crime follows jurisdiction to prescribe.l
This Article will not treat jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to
adjudicate as airtight compartments. They are not. This Article will discuss specific issues that involve both authority to prescribe law for persons
and authority to adjudicate allegations of crime against persons. Where
both authorities are involved, this Article will use the general term "personal jurisdiction."
The doctrine of jurisdiction to prescribe in international law has generally applied to the authority of States, rather than international organizations, to make rules of law and apply them to persons who are either not
16
their nationals, or not within their boundaries when they act, or both.
The issue is whether a given State has an appropriate connection with an
act to apply its definition of crime (whether an ordinary crime or what is
Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 145, 179 (1972-73)
(relying on use of "legislative" rather than "prescriptive").
13. This power is generally possessed by civil courts, but may also include in
some cases institutions such as courts-martial, or national or international military
tribunals.
14.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 423 (1987) (discussing national courts' "jurisdiction to Adjudicate"). The law
concerning jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate in private, non-criminal
cases is different, and is the subject of the vast literature of conflict of laws or
private international law.
15. See generally Akehurst, supra note 12, at 179 ("In criminal law, legislative
and judicial jurisdiction are one and the same.").
16. See, e.g.,
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (5th

ed. 1998) (providing general definition of jurisdictional competence and collecting sources); MARK W.JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 322 (3d ed.
1999) (commenting that territorial jurisdiction is most important of principles justifying state's assertion of jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402-404 (1987) (characterizing jurisdiction to
prescribe concerning crimes under international law as State function); Leila
Sadat, Redefining UniversalJurisdiction,35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241, 246 n.28 (2001)
(describing universal international jurisdiction as alternative to territorial jurisdic-

tion); Sadat & Carden, supra note 10, at 406 ("[T] hese three jurisdictional categories classically known to international law have been transformed from norms
providing 'which state can exercise authority over whom, and in what circumstances,' to norms that establish tinder what conditions the international community... may prescribe international rules of conduct.") (quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 56 (1994)).
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now treated as a crime against international law) to it. The currently dominant classification is as follows: "States exercise jurisdiction in the field of
criminal law on five bases: territory, protection, nationality of offender [active personality], nationality of victim [passive personality], and universality."1 7 Not all crimes may be prosecuted on every basis, under either
national or international law. For example, so-called protective jurisdiction is generally claimed by States only with regard to crimes, such as
18
counterfeiting their own currency that substantially affect their interests.
Universal jurisdiction-jurisdiction over crimes committed anywhere, by
anyone and against any victim-may, pursuant to international law, only
be exercised with respect to a few crimes at most. 19 Not every State ac20
cepts jurisdiction over those crimes on a universal basis.
In the case of ordinary crimes (non-international crimes), a State with
jurisdiction to prescribe in fact defines the offense. Even where a crime,
such as murder, exists in nearly all legal systems, each jurisdiction may
have a different definition, or apply a different set of penalties or allow
different defenses.
By contrast, no single State defines international criminal law, and
there is no general international legislature. An international criminal tribunal, furthermore, is not a State or an organ of a State. The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda are
organs of an international organization, the U.N. The ICC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone are each international organizations
themselves.
In none of these Courts does the prescriptive function exist wholly
within the Court itself. These Courts break from the traditional articulation of the rule that an entity's (traditionally a State's) jurisdiction to prescribe is a prerequisite to that entity's jurisdiction to adjudicate an
allegation of crime. This is especially true in the case of the ICC, which is
17.

WILLIAM

A.

SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

59 (2001); accord Randall, supra note 12, at 787-88 (furthering proposition
that state interest unusually occurs in criminal context). See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402, 404 (1987)
(discussing territorial aspects of jurisdiction); Akehurst, supra note 12, at 156-66
(treating passive personality jurisdiction in discussion of universal jurisdiction);
Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 47-48 (2001) (treating this formulation as set of rules
of international law currently defining when State may exercise jurisdiction over
person). One of the bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, territorial "effects" jurisdiction, is discussed in Part V(B)(1) below. Another basis, "passive personality jurisdiction" is discussed in Part VI(A) below. "Universal jurisdiction" is discussed in
Part VI(B) (2) below.
18. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 12, at 157-59 (discussing scope of protective
jurisdiction principle).
19. See id. at 160-62; see also Randall, supra note 12, at 791-815 (discussing universal jurisdiction applicability to piracy, slave trading, war crimes and crimes
against humanity).
20. See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 12, at 164-65 (addressing possible solutions
to difference in states' interpretation of international law).
COURT
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not an organ of the U.N. The ICC as an international organization does
not exercise the entire prescriptive function. 2' The identity of the
lawmaker for an international criminal tribunal, and for international
22
criminal law as a whole, is problematic.
The question asked here is this:
Which prescribing authorities can an international criminal
court legitimately draw upon to justify its exercise of power over
individuals?
We begin with an example of a traditional crime against the "law of nations," piracy.
A.

Piracy: International Crime Without an International Court

Piracy is the most familiar of the so-called crimes against the law of
nations, or international crimes, occurring in the period before World
War II. Occasionally other crimes against the law of nations were named
including slave trading 23 and crimes against ambassadors.24 Piracy, however, was viewed as the archetype of them, and the second most promi25
nent, slave trading, was sometimes defined in law as a type of piracy.

In the absence of an international tribunal, an international legislature or international conventional law, the early definition of international crimes necessarily occurred in individual States and their penal
systems, 2 6 and among authors on international law. 27 They frequently

21. See Sadat, supra note 16, at 245-46 (noting that ICC Statute is not explicit
on prescriptive jurisdiction).
22. Some opponents of international criminal tribunals use this as ajustification for their positions. See, e.g., Alfred P. Rubin, A Critical View of the International
Criminal Court, in 23 FLETCHER FORUM ON WORLD AFFAIRS 139 (1999).
23. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 12, at 788 (describing slave trade as prototypical offense that any state can define and punish).
24. See 4 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*70-71 (1772) (noting that rights of ambassadors were established by law of nations). Blackstone also discusses violations of safe conducts and passports in his
section on crimes against the law of nations, but he speaks of them as causes for
war or for punishment under specific provisions of the laws of England, rather
than as individual crimes against the law of nations. See id. at 69-70.
25. See, e.g., Piracy Act of May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 600, 600-01 (1850), discussed
and reprinted in ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAw OF PIRACY 147-48, 192 n.114, 381-82
(1988) (presenting evidence that definition of piracy was confused, as felonious
intent requirement was unclear); see also Randall, supra note 12, at 799-800 (citing
British treaties defining slave trading as type of piracy).
26. See BARRY HART DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY 40-42
(1980); see also RUBIN, supra note 25, at 68 (commenting that England established
jurisdiction over pirates' acts by analogizing impact on English ship to impact of
physical presence in English county); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987) (positing that jurisdiction to prescribe concerning crimes under international law is State function).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-80 (1820) (collecting
authors who discussed varying definitions of crime of piracy).
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conceptualized the ultimate lawmaker, forbidding piracy as the international community. A classic statement of this doctrine occurs in Blackstone, who states that the statutory law of England on piracy "interposes to
aid and enforce the law of nations as part of the common law." 2 8 It is even
clearer in this American judicial statement:
[t]he general practice of all nations in punishing all persons,
whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this offence
against any persons whatsoever, with whom they are in amity, is a
conclusive proof that the offence is supposed to depend, not
upon the particular provisions of any municipal code, but upon
29
the law of nations, both for its definition and punishment.
In fact, the American legislature had defined piracy by reference to "the
law of nations," rather than by enacting language prohibiting certain conduct. In the quoted case, the United States Supreme Court rejected a
challenge that this method of definition was too indefinite to provide fair
notice of what was prohibited, even though nations did not have a single
30
definition of piracy adopted as part of their municipal laws.
The international law tradition does contain contradictory statements

whether piracy "as an offense against the law of nations" truly means that it
is a specific crime against international law, or whether it simply means all
nations have jurisdiction to punish pirates under their municipal law. 3 1
28. BLACKSI'ONE, supra note 24, at *73 (stating that principle cases involve inflicting adequate punishment for offenses against universal law committed by private individuals). Rubin argues that Blackstone's "use of the phrase 'law of
nations' assumed the supremacy of municipal law in particular whatever the basis
in policy, reason or historical practice for the identity of prescription applied by
the courts of different nations." RUBIN, supra note 25, at 109 (examining Blackstone's position on English piracy law). Given the usage of the phrase "law of
nations" here, and in an another extended quotation Rubin uses, it does not seem
correct to say that Blackstone believes there is no international law of piracy other
than parallel prescriptions in different national jurisdictions. Compare RUBIN, supra
note 25, at 109, with BLACKSTONE, supra note 24, at *67 (proposing definition of
"law of nations").
29. Smith, 18 U.S. at 162-63 (accepting Congressional definition of piracy by
reference to law of nations).
30. See id. at 162 ("We have, therefore, no hesitation in declaring, that piracy,
by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea, and that it is sufficiently and constitutionally defined by the fifth section of the act of 1819."). For the point that
nations did not have a single municipal definition of piracy, see Randall, supra
note 12, at 795-97.
31. See, e.g., 2 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & VED P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (JURISDICTION AND COOPERATION) 32-33 (1973) (discussing
offense against law of nations line); DUBNER, supra note 26, at 43-44 (defending

municipal substance/universal jurisdiction line but also citing conflicting views),
relying on Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy with
Comments, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 749, 758 (1932) [hereinafter HarvardDraft Convention]
("The proper purpose of a draft convention codifying the international law of
piracy ...

[is] to define this extraordinary basis of state jurisdiction over offences

committed by foreigners against foreign interests outside the territorial and other
ordinary jurisdiction of the prosecuting state."); see also 1 ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER,
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The jurisdictional view was stated forcefully by a Harvard Study Group in
the early 1930s:
International law piracy is only a special ground of state jurisdiction-of jurisdiction in every state. This jurisdiction may or may
not be exercised by a certain state. It may be used in part only.
How far it is used depends on the municipal law of the state, not
32
on the law of nations.
Even if the international law of piracy is seen as allowing the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction, some sense existed in international law of what
33
class of acts made one hostis humani generis (an enemy of all humanity),
giving rise to universal jurisdiction to punish. Otherwise, the jurisdiction
34
could have expanded without limit, which it did not.
The distinction between piracy being an international crime and be-

ing a class of acts over which, under international law, any or all national
courts may claim criminal jurisdiction "may not make an important difference."35 That is, absent an international criminal tribunal, a State may
prosecute a foreign pirate because it believes it is enforcing its own law,
made pursuant to international law, or because it believes it is prosecuting
TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 11-12 (1979) (advocating offense against law nations line); KTrrICHAISAREE, supra note 8, at 14-15
("[P]irates are tried by municipal courts and punishable under municipal law, not
international law. International law merely concedes that every State has universal
jurisdiction to try and punish pirates when they come within their respective jurisdiction."); RUBIN, supra note 25, at 109 (taking view that piracy is municipal law
crime).
32. HarvardDraft Convention, supra note 31, at 759-60 (discussed extensively in
DUBNER, supra 26, at 40-44).
33. See 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *113 (1629)
(originating phrase "an enemy of all humanity"). For further discussion of hostis
humani generis's background, see RUBIN, supra note 25, at 82-85 (providing historical perspective; Rubin spells first word "hostes').
34. See Randall, supra note 12, at 795-97 (noting that State cannot acquire
jurisdiction over person when he or she commits acts constituting piracy under
domestic but not international law). This conclusion can be seen injustice Story's
opinion in Smith, but was disagreed with by justice Livingston in dissent. See Smith,
18 U.S. at 164-83 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's definition
of piracy). Rubin also argues that universal jurisdiction over piracy existed only for
a limited time, and has been abandoned. But see Akehurst, supra note 12, at 160
(discussing current applicability of universality principle).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404, Rptrs' note 1 (1987) ("Whether piracy is an international crime, or is rather
a matter of international concern as to which international law accepts the jurisdiction of all states, may not make an important difference."); accord Randall, supra
note 12, at 788 (providing that universality principle assumes that every state has
interest in exercising jurisdiction to combat "egregious offenses" condemned by
states). One example of an early author who does not appear to distinguish between these two views is EMER DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS Bk. I, Ch. XIX,
para. 232, p. 108 (Ingraham's edition of Chitty ed. 1852).
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a crime pursuant to the law of nations. The difference is conceptualization, but either way a prosecution may proceed in the national court. 36
This confusion in the tradition has some consequence for modern
international criminal law. At the time modern international criminal law
began, with the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, there was no clear,
agreed upon conceptualization of the international community as the definer of international criminal law. Yet one could not say that there was no
such thing as international crime defined by the law of nations.
B.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: Differing Views of Prescription

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg viewed prescriptive
authority largely as a national function. In many ways the Nuremberg proceedings were an advance for international criminal justice, especially in
the public imagination. Yet from the point of view of lawmaking authority,
the Nuremberg Charter 37 and the main Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal, 38 as written, are conservative. Where the national
model of prescription broke down, the Tribunal struggled, especially,

though not only, in its discussion of crimes against humanity. The purpose of this discussion is neither to validate nor to condemn the Tribu-

nal's reasoning, which have both been done extensively before. 3 9 The
purpose is to examine the Tribunal's conceptualization of the prescribing
authority for the crimes within its jurisdiction (though some critique will

inevitably appear).
The Charter named the crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal (Tribunal).40 The Tribunal itself stated several
times that this document was conclusive as to the existence of the crimes
36. See Randall, supra note 12, at 795-97 (noting that States may define
"piracy" more broadly than international law, but when it applies broadened part
of definition, it must have some basis ofjurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate
other than universal jurisdiction); cf. infra Part VI(B) (discussing problem of war
crimes defined by treaty rather than customary international law).
37. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter], annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No.
472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 284 [hereinafter London Agreement], reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 8-9 (1947) (outlining process for bringing war criminals to justice).
38. United States et al., v. Goring et al., 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 171 (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment] (noting that Tribunal was given power to try and punish those who committed crimes against humanity as defined by Charter).
39. See, e.g., NINA H.B. JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 28 n.1-2 (2000) (providing criticisms of Nuremberg Trial from English, American and German commentators).
40. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 37, arts. 6, 9, 10 (listing crimes over
which Tribunal has jurisdiction as crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes
against humanity).
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and their applicability to the defendants at Nuremberg.4 1 In doing so, it
treated the States agreeing to the London Agreement and Nuremberg
Charter as the prescribing authority for the Tribunal:
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these
countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recog42
nized by the civilized world.
The discussion appears to claim that the sovereign right of the victors
to legislate-especially by defining crimes but also by creating a Tribunal
to try them-would override all claims concerning individual rights of defendants. The Tribunal said that nulla crimen sine lege (no act is criminal in
the absence of a law against it) "is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in
general a principle ofjustice"43 that apparently can be overridden by sovereign will.
Nonetheless, in response to claims that prosecuting the Nuremberg
defendants amounted to a violation of the rule nulla crimen sine lege, the
Tribunal also justified its holdings concerning the definitions of the
crimes set out in the Charter by reference to international law. It began by
claiming:
The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of
the victorious Nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, as will be
shown, it is the expression of international law existing at the
time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution to
44
international law.
Most of the international law that the Tribunal relied upon was treaty law,
in which States had exercised their sovereign authority to bind themselves
and their citizens. The Tribunal relied several times on multilateral treaties to which Germany was a party and documents relevant to their interpretation for the definitions of crimes, particularly war crimes. 45 Thus, it
41. See NurembergJudgment, supra note 38, at 173-74, 218, 228, 232, 243, 253
(noting that actions of Germany violated laws of war).
42. Id. at 218 (noting that law of Charter is decisive and binding upon Tribunal). The Nuremberg judgment states that any of the parties to the London
Agreement could have set up a military tribunal on its own, given its right "to set
up special courts to administer law." Id.
43. Id. at 219 (noting that in this case it would be unjust if wrongs were allowed to go unpunished).
44. Id. at 218.
45. See id. at 216-18, 219-23, 238-39, 253 (containing Kellogg-Briand Pact and
earlier documents). It is not clear that all the materials used in interpreting the
Kellogg-Briand pact would be used under modern practice codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
May 23, 1969, arts. 31-32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 362, 362-63 (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980) [hereinafter VCOLT] (listing acceptable means of interpretation of provisions of international agreements).
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relied on States as explicit prescriptive authorities in two ways: through the
direct exercise of individual sovereignty (or delegated sovereignty to the
Tribunal) as permitted to occupying powers under international law, and
as parties to multilateral treaties setting forth law governing them.
In response to an argument that certain provisions of the Hague Convention of 190746 were not facially applicable to the Nuremberg defendants because the treaty itself was inapplicable to World War II, the
Tribunal stated that these provisions may have been new treaty rules in
1907, "but by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of
47
the laws and customs of war which are referred to in . . .the Charter."

This is to say that the rules adopted by some States through the treaty
making process had later become part of customary international law, regardless of the applicability of the Hague Convention itself. The prescriptive authority here is articulated as "all civilized nations"-in other words,
the then-recognized international community.
Similarly, the Tribunal claimed the international community as a
source of law, in response to the argument that international law binds
only States, not individuals:
[t]he very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of
war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing48 action moves
outside its competence under international law.
This assertion however, was made immediately after the Tribunal relied on
the text of its Charter as authority for charging individuals with violations
of international law. 49 The Judgment immediately followed with a similar
pairing of Charter text and appeal to "the law of all nations" and "interna5
tional law" as reasons for rejecting the defense of superior orders. 0
The Nuremberg Judgment does not contain a complete articulation
of the Tribunal's views as to the law making authorities behind international criminal law. In particular, the opinion does not make clear how
crimes against humanity were defined, other than by the fiat of the victorious Allies. The statement that the Charter "is the expression of interna46. See Hague Convention (No. IV)Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Oct. 19, 1907, arts. 46, 50, 52, 56, 36 Stat. 2277, 2306-09, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp.
90 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).
47. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 38, at 253-54 (discussing Article 6 of
Charter pertaining to "War Crimes" and "Crimes Against Humanity").
48. Id. at 223.
49. See id. ("Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can
the provisions of international law be enforced.").
50. See id. at 223-24.
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tional law existing at the time of its creation" is not fully justified by the
discussion regarding these crimes. 5 1 The model of pre-World War II creation of crimes by sovereign international acts broke down because there
were no treaties defining crimes against humanity, as there were defining
violations of the laws of war. That is, the Tribunal found no easy bridge
from a treaty (such as the Hague Convention) whose provisions had become recognized by the laws of all civilized countries. Nor did the Tribunal present other evidence of customary international law defining crimes
against humanity. In sum, it did not state a source of prescription for
crimes against humanity in the community of nations. Nevertheless, the
Tribunal was reluctant to appear to rely wholly on the law-making author52
ity of the Occupying Powers as the source of crimes against humanity,
leaving the reader somewhat unsatisfied as to the source of lawmaking
53
authority.

51. See id. at 218 ("The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding upon the
Tribunal."), 254-55 (discussion of crimes against humanity); see also SADAT, supra
note 10, at 30 n.34 (quoting Theodor Meron, The Role of Custom in the Formation of
International HumanitarianLaw, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 239 (1996)) (noting that
Nuremberg Tribunal "paid little attention to the process or rationale by which
various provisions of humanitarian conventions were transformed into customary
international law").
52. The literature discussing the existence of crimes against humanity in international law at the time of World War II or the Nuremberg Tribunal is extensive. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 294
(1992) (arguing that France did not accept crimes against humanity as independent class of crime).
53. Crimes against humanity by now appear well established as customary international law. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter
Secretary General's Rep.] (discussing how crimes against humanity became customary international law); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1 (ICTY App. Ch., Oct. 2,
1995), paras. 13742, available at www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/
51002.htm [hereinafter Decision on Appeal on Jurisdiction]; see also KrTTICHAISAREE, supra note 8, at 88-89 ("Now, it is a settled rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity are international crimes and the
perpetrators of these crimes incur individual criminal responsibility."). But cf.
Christian Tomuschat, International Criminal Prosecution: The Precedent of Nuremberg
Confirmed, 5 CRIM. L.F. 23742 (1994) (questioning whether all of crimes against
humanity listed in ICTY and ICTR Statutes were truly customary); Sadat & Carden,
supra note 10, at 426-27 (pointing out that before Rome Conference there was no
single, accepted definition of crimes against humanity in treaty or customary international law, and showing variety of formulations in Nuremberg Charter, Control
Council Law No. 10, IMTFE Charter, ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute, municipal law
provisions and International Law Commission versions) (citing STEVEN R. RATNER
& JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 45-48 (1997)). Sadat concludes that
once the Nuremberg Judgment was entered, it "arguably created the positive law
thought lacking prior to its existence." SADAT, supra note 10, at 30.
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As to the crime of aggression, the Tribunal purported to find the outlawry of aggressive war in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 54 read in light of other
documents of the interwar period. 5 5 This may be convincing in terms of
the lawfulness of the acts of Germany as a State. The Tribunal's opinion
does not, however, refer to a source of the prescription defining the planning and implementation of aggressive war as a crime that can be committed by individuals. As with crimes against humanity, the Tribunal makes
no clear statement of the identity of the lawmaker, other than the Allies,
yet it appears not to wish to depend solely upon their fiat.
Some prescription is derived from the Nuremberg Charter as implemented by the decision of the International Military Tribunal, rather than
directly from the Charter itself. The outlawry of specific organizations was
authorized by the Nuremberg Charter, and the Tribunal's Judgment declared the leadership corps of the Nazi party and some other organiza56

tions criminal.

Here we have the beginning of a notion that an international body,
which has been given appropriate powers by the States that have constituted it, can prescribe for persons, either natural or juridical, that fall
within its jurisdiction. The consequence of a finding that the Nazi party
was a criminal organization was that members could not deny the illegality
of the organization in subsequent cases, even though they had not been
party to the case in which the finding was made. That is, the Nuremberg
Judgment prescribed that part of the law relating to the legality of organizations under which the subsequent defendants were tried.
There was an important further discussion of prescriptive authority
later in the prosecutions of Germans for World War II atrocities, under
Control Council Law No. 10, an international military agreement authorizing each of the occupying powers to set up national military tribunals in its
own sector of Germany. 57 The United States Military Tribunal (USMT),
established under Control Council Law No. 10, repeated the formulations
of the International Military Tribunal including the authority of conquering powers to lay down jurisdiction and define crimes for the USMT. The
USMT, however, added discussions indicating that it saw crimes against
humanity as prohibited by the practice of States and the opinion of states54. Kellog-Briand Pact, August 27, 1928, arts. 1 & 2, 46 Stat. 2343, 2345-46, 94

L.N.T.S. 57, 59-63 (entered into force July 24, 1929).
55. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 38, at 219-24 (noting that previous
international history supports Tribunal's position).
56. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 37, arts. 8-9 (stating that individuals
only are subject to punishment despite having acted upon orders of appointment
or superior, but that tribunal may declare criminal group or organization of which
defendant is member); Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 38, discussed further in
text and infra notes 151-52.
57. See Control Council Law No. 10 (20 December 1945), reprinted in 1 TiiE
LAw OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HisroRY 908 (Leon Friedman ed. 1972) (setting
rules for punishment of crimes against humanity and war crimes in occupied
territory).
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men. 58 German acts charged as crimes against humanity were character59
ized as "violations ... of common international law."
The conceptualization of the prescribing authority for crimes against
humanity was more complete in this national tribunal than in the main
Nuremberg Judgment. The way in which the international community as
a whole is seen as a source of prescriptive authority was more specifically
defined, alongside the authority of the States creating the Tribunal and
the specific State trying the case.
Politically, the main Nuremberg Judgment was of immeasurable importance to the development of international criminal law and to the view
that the international community as a whole can and should take action
against those individuals who grossly violate international humanitarian
norms. The International Military Tribunal did recognize customary international law as a source of international criminal law applicable to individuals, and, in this sense, the case has not been distorted. However,
much of its Judgment continued to rely on the more limited view that the
Allied powers, establishing the Tribunal pursuant to the London Agreement, were the real source of its prescriptive authority.
The Nuremberg bases for creation of international criminal law were
generally recognized by the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (IMTFE or the Tokyo Tribunal), with some subtle differences tilting
in favor of an international prescriptive authority. The IMTFE's main
judgment appears to pull back from the Nuremberg claim that the drafters of its Charter had full sovereign legislative authority in the occupied
territory. 60 It rejected that sweeping view through language questioning
whether it had ever really been advanced: "In the exercise of their right to
create tribunals for such a purpose [(i.e., for the trial and punishment of
war criminals)] and in conferring power on such tribunals[,] belligerent
powers may act only within the limits of international law." 6 ' Thus, the
prescriptive authority of the victorious states was seen as limited by the
62
prescriptions against crimes existing in international law.
58. See United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), in 3

TRIALS OF WAR

CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL

LAw No. 10 954, 963-71 (1946-1953); accord United States v. Ohlendorf (The Ein-

satzgruppen Case), in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 411, 453-62 (1946-1953).
59. See Alstoetter, in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, supra note 58, at 979.
60. For a further discussion of the Nuremberg claim, see supra notes 42-44

and accompanying text.
61. United States v. Araki (I.M.T. Far East, 1948), reprinted in 101 THE ToKo
MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE RECORDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

FOR THE FAR EAST 48415, 48436 (R. John Pritchard ed. 1998).
62. The editor of THE ToKYo MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE RECORDS OF THE
("IMTFE Proceedings") sug-

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

gests that this limitation was motivated by the fact that strictly speaking Japan had

not surrendered unconditionally to the Allies, that the Japanese civil authority had
not wholly been extinguished by conquest (unlike the Nazi German authority) and
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There is one significant difference in the source of prescriptive and
adjudicative authority of the Tokyo Tribunal and that of Nuremberg. The
Tokyo IMTFE was not created by an explicit international agreement, such
as the London Agreement. Instead, it was the creation of the Supreme
Allied Commander for the Far East, General Douglas A. MacArthur,
through the issuance of a Special Proclamation. 6" The Proclamation was
based upon the authority to implement the terms of surrender granted to
the Supreme Commander for the Allies in the Instrument of Surrender
and in a later agreement among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the
United States. 64 The Instrument of Surrender referenced the Potsdam
Declaration, which stated, "stern justice shall be meted out to all war
criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners." 65 In other words, the establishment of the IMTFE was an executive
exercise of a power granted in international agreements, including an
agreement signed by the defeated power. The London Agreement, with
the annexed Nuremberg Charter, was an international agreement about
how to handle affairs in a state that had surrendered unconditionally.36
This difference may explain, in part, the IMTFE's reluctance to claim the
use of the sovereign legislative authority of the States that conquered
67
Japan.
The main IMTFE judgment is less expansive on issues of prescriptive
authority than it might have been. It expressly disavows a wish to revisit
certain issues decided at the main Nuremberg trial. These issues include
that the legitimacy of the trial depended upon the "express consent of the Japanese state to submit itself to the jurisdiction of such a court." 101 THE TOKYO
MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE RECORDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

FOR THE FAR EAST xvii, xxxi (R.

John Pritchard ed. 1998) [hereinafter IMTFE

PRO-

CEEDINGS] (relying on uncited work of Georg Schwarzenberger, as well as James
Crawford, Prospects for an International Criminal Court, in 48 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 303, 306 (M.D.A. Freeman & R. Halson eds. 1995)). The defense's efforts to raise these issues as arguments may have led to this limitation. See id. at
xxxi-xli n.23.
63. See 104 IMTFE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62, at 16-17 (providing Special
Proclamationby the Supreme Commanderfor the Allied Powers, Establishment of an International Militaiy Tribunal for the Far East (Jan. 19, 1946) as "Annex A-4 of the
Judgment").
64. See id. at 15-17 (reproducing Moscow Conference Agreement as "Annex A-

3 of the Judgment" and Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commanderfor the Allied
Powers, Establishment of an International Military Tribunalfor the Far East (Jan. 19,
1946) as "Annex A-4 of the Judgment").

65. Id. at 1, 3, 11, 12 (reproducing Potsdam Declaration of United States,
United Kingdom and China (July 26, 1945) as "Appendix A-I of the Judgment"
and Instrument of Surrender (Sept. 2, 1945), which refers to Potsdam Declaration,
as "Annex A-2 of the Judgment"); see also Morris, supra note 17, at 37-38.
66. See London Agreement, supra note 37, at 8, 10; 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-

TARY

TRIBUNAL 171, 218 (acknowledging IMT's recognition of this view).
67. For further discussion of the IMTFE's reluctance to claim the use of the
sovereign legislative authority of the States that conquered Japan, see supra note 62
and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 2
VII1'NovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48: p. 763

existence of the crime of waging aggressive war (based on the KelloggBriand Pact), individual criminal liability in international law, the application of the nulla crimen principle to the proceedings and the defense of
superior orders.68 These issues might be expected to raise the problem of
lawmaking authority. The extended judgment of the IMTFE is much
more narrative than analytical and does not pay the same independent
69
attention to lawmaking authority as does the Nuremberg Judgment.

In terms of lawmaking authority, the IMTFE's judgment appears
more internationalist than does the NurembergJudgment. It did not have
the same effect on political and popular minds as did the Nuremberg
Judgment, however.

In the end, the two post-World War II tribunals presented a variety of
views concerning the sources of lawmaking authority for international
criminal courts. They did not either individually or together, provide a
clear, unified theory that future court-builders could easily take over.
C.

The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the New Special Court
for Sierra Leone

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are
subsidiary organs of the U.N. The U.N. also helped create the Special

Court for Sierra Leone (Special Court). The U.N. Charter does not explicitly contain general authority to legislate internationally, either for individuals or states. Thus, the source of prescriptive authority in the ICTY,
the ICTR and the Special Court is problematic.
When the ICTY was created, the U.N. Secretary General emphasized
the importance of international custom to the creation of international
criminal law. In his report proposing establishment of the ICTY, the Secretary General suggested that the crimes over which the ICTY have jurisdiction should include only those that were "doubtless [a] part of
customary international law." 70 The Secretary General did not ignore
68. See 101 IMTFE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62, at 48, 437-39.
69. By contrast, the five separate IMTFE opinions do pay extended attention
to the issues of prescription and prescribing authority. The extent of that attention, however, is more than fairly can be dealt with in this Article. See generally 105
IMTFE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62 (Concurring Opinion of Jaranilla; Dissenting
Opinion of Bernard; first portions of dissenting opinion of Pal); see also 109 id.
(Separate Opinions of Webb, President and of R1ing). These opinions present
varying ideas that enrich the discussion of issues presented by the main IMTFE
judgment, as well as the Nuremberg Judgment, rather than fully resolving them.
See id. Unfortunately, due to the difficulty of finding these opinions and, to some
extent, their length, they have been even further from the mainstream of political
and popular thought about international crime than the main IMTFE Judgment.
See

RICHARD

H.

MINFAR, VICTOR'S JUSTICE:

THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL

32-33

(1971) (discussing troubled history of publication of separate IMTFE opinions,
especially dissent ofJustice Pal).
70. Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, paras. 33-35.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/2

20

Gallant: Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in Inter
2003]

JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS

783

treaty law but defined crimes in his proposed ICTY Statute only with refer71
ence to treaties that had become part of international customary law.
There is an important split in the prescriptive authority in the case of
the ICTY. The international community as a whole is seen as the definer
of customary international crimes, but the U.N. created the organ with
jurisdiction to prosecute them. Because of the near-universality of U.N.
membership, one can look at the two groups exercising prescriptive jurisdiction as nearly identical. In this case however, the U.N. acts through the
Security Council. The Security Council is at once a clearly defined actor
(unlike "the international community as a whole"), a principal organ of an
international organization and a much smaller group than "the international community."
This dual prescriptive authority was accepted by the ICTY early on, in
Prosecutorv. Tadic.7 2 Tadic accepted the authority of the Security Council
to establish the ICTY pursuant to its authority to take actions to restore
and to maintain international peace and security. 73 It also accepted the
international community as the creator of customary international crimi74
nal law applying to individuals such as Mr. Tadic.
By contrast, the Statute of the ICTR is not limited to crimes that are
unquestionably customary. It grants the tribunal jurisdiction over treatybased crimes not included in the ICTY's crimes termed "doubtless part of
customary international law." Specifically, the ICTR has jurisdiction to
prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of Additional Protocol
1I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 7 5 Rwanda was a party to this treaty
before the commission of any of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court. 7 6 Thus, Rwanda served as one of the States acting as lawmaker
concerning these crimes.
71. See id. paras. 35, 37-46.
72. See Decision on Appeal on Jurisdiction,supra note 53, paras. 137-42.

73. See id. paras. 32-48.
74. See id. paras. 96-136.
75. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 4, adopted by
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th year, 3453d meeting, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (incorporating serious violations of Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), which were
not among sources of customary international law crimes in Secretary General's
Report recommending creation of ICTY).
76. Thus, Rwanda's citizens and those acting on its territory could be held to
the Protocol's standards, which include the principle of nulla crimen sine lege. See
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), U.N.
Doc. A/32/144, art. 6(2)(c) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol No. II]. In Prosecutorv. Akayesu, the ICTR
relied both on the ratification of Protocol No. II by Rwanda on November 19, 1984
and on a claim that the content of Protocol No. II is now customary international
criminal law. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998),
Judgement, para. 617, availableat http://www.ictr.org/; see alsoJOHN R.W.D.JONES,
THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGO-
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The theory behind the inclusion of treaty crimes in the ICTR is that,
as States, Rwanda and other members of the international community
have the authority to define crimes (i.e., to have jurisdiction to prescribe
criminal offenses) through the treaty-making process. Where the U.N.
may establish an international criminal tribunal pursuant to Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, 77 it may endow the tribunal with jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations of commission of treaty-based crimes, where the states in
whose territory the crimes may have been committed are parties to the
relevant treaties. 78 While states, through the treaty making process, may
define international crimes for themselves (presumably as far as provided
by the specific jurisdiction), the U.N., an international organization acting
pursuant to its Charter, may create an organ with jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims of criminal violations of the treaty based rules. 79 In other words,
the U.N., through the Security Council, sets out the international crimes
over which the ICTR has jurisdiction.
In both the case of the ICTR and the ICTY, the Security Council, as a
principal organ of the U.N., claimed the authority to establish an international criminal tribunal as part of its mandate to restore and maintain international peace and security.8 0 This included the authority to specify
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the tribunal and, at least, to define
them within the parameters of possible international crimes under customary international law or, in the case of Rwanda, international treaties
to which the relevant State has acceded. Yet, as indicated by the Secretary
General's statements and the actual Statutes of the Security Council, the
U.N. was reluctant to claim general authority as the voice of the interna496-97 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing U.N. conduct relating to Protocol No. 11); Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused
in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUMAN Rrs. L. REV. 545, 576 n.1 33
(1998) (noting that Rwanda has ratified Geneva Conventions and additional
protocols).
77. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, paras. 18-30; see also Decision on Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 53, paras. 28-48.
78. See Decision on Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 53, paras. 143-44. The
decision to allow prosecution of treaty-based crimes in article 4 of the ICTR Statute
follows the discussion in the IMTFE Judgment allowing prosecution for "conventional war crimes" in the Tokyo Tribunal. See 101 IMTFE PROCEEDINGS, supranote
62, at 48440, 48442-47. While the idea of prosecution for conventional war crimes
appears in the Nuremberg Judgment, it is much less important because of the
colorable claim of the Nuremberg defendants that the relevant treaties did not
apply to the European phase of World War 1I. Thus, the Nuremberg Judgment
argued that the war crimes involved were customary law. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 38, at 253-54.
79. This is not to deny that the states themselves could have established an
international tribunal, which is the theory of the ICC Statute, discussed at length
below. See also Agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone,
supra note 11.
80. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, paras. 18-30; see also Decision on Appeal on Jurisdiction, supra note 53, paras. 28-48.
SLAVIA AND RWANDA
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tional community to create international criminal law. Indeed, no such
general power to make international law is stated in the U.N. Charter.
In the case of the ad hoc tribunals, the Secretary General and the Security Council appear to have rejected the idea that it "may not make an
important difference" whether the Security Council is exercising a power
to define crimes or merely a power to create jurisdiction in a tribunal.8 1
In order to create a tribunal, the Security Council must properly exercise
both powers. Through the Security Council, the U.N. must choose substantive international criminal law from a source with international law
legitimacy and must also have authority to create jurisdiction in an ad hoc
tribunal.
The new joint national/international Special Court continues and expands on the uses of the ICTY and ICTR. As with the two prior tribunals,
its creation was authorized by the Security Council. 8 2 In two ways, however, its jurisdictional basis is different. First, it is an independent international organization created pursuant to an agreement between Sierra
Leone and the U.N., not a subsidiary organ of the U.N. 83 This is another
indication of the flexibility that the Security Council has to create appropriate devices for restoring and maintaining peace and security. Second,
the Statute of the Special Court gives it jurisdiction both over international crimes and over certain crimes under Sierra Leone law. 84 At least
where there is consent of the relevant State, an international organization
may exercise judicial functions of that State.
The purposes of the Special Court are to bring perpetrators of international crimes to justice, and to help rebuild a fair, independentjudicial
system in post civil war Sierra Leone. Not only does the Special Court
have jurisdiction over national and international crimes, but it is jointly
staffed by national and international personnel. It is too early to know
whether this experiment will be successful.
D.

The InternationalCriminal Court (ICC)

The Statute of the ICC continues the development of the law of international prescription. The ICC will be an independent international organization in its own right, intended to be permanent. The judicial
functioning of the Court is characterized as its primary object, but the ICC
also has its Assembly of States Parties, which will enjoy responsibilities such
as approval of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Elements of
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 404, Rptrs.' Note 1 ("Whether piracy is an international crime, or is rather a
matter of international concern as to which international law accepts the jurisdiction of all states, may not make an important difference").
82. See Special Court Statute, supra note 11.
83. See Agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone,
supra note 11.

84. See Special Court Statute, supra note 11, art. 7.
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Crimes and the budget, and oversight of the Court's operations. 85 Obviously, some of these authorities play a role in prescription. The ICC Statute does disregard the distinctive feature of modern ad hoc tribunals:
referral of situations to an international tribunal by the U.N. Security
86
Council. This is one of the ways in which the ICC will hear cases.
The ICC Statute provides at least four sources of jurisdiction to prescribe: the international community as a whole, the States adopting the
ICC Statute, the U.N. Security Council and the ICC itself.
First, the Statute incorporates customary law or jus cogens peremptory
norms, in the cases of genocide, many crimes against humanity and war
crimes. To this extent, it is following the stated tradition of the earlier
tribunals and will enforce the customary criminal law made by the international community as a whole.
Unfortunately, the "international community as a whole" is an amorphous concept.8 7 Having no general legislature, it cannot articulate the
rules of custom by itself. Thus, it does not state the rules proscribing certain conduct as criminal. These rules are articulated by individual States
acting through their politicians, diplomats and jurists, by States acting together in creating treaties, by international organizations, such as the
U.N., acting through State representatives, as in a resolution of the General Assembly,8 8 or through their own officials, 89 by publicists or by a com-

bination of these actors. The ICC Statute's drafters felt that further
85. See generally David Donat-Cattin, Decision-Making in the International Criminal Court: Functions of the Assembly of States Parties and Independence of the Court'sJudicial Organs (discussing international organization status of Assembly of States
Parties) in 2 LAT-rANZI & SCHABAS, supra note 3; see also Gallant, supra note 3
(same). The assembly of States Parties has adopted the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, the Elements of Crimes and the Budget for the first financial period of
the Court. See Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
First Session, New York, 3-10 Sept. 2002, Official Records, ICC-ASP/1/3, para. 22,
at 5, 10, 108 [hereinafter ICC-ASP/1/3] (Rules of Procedure and Evidence and
Elements of Crimes), adopted Sept. 9, 2002; see id. para. 19, at 5, 253 (Budget),
adopted Sept. 3, 2002.
86. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 13. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, a refer-

ral to the ICC by the Security Council does not involve the creation of a new court.
87. This is one reason that has been used for rejecting the notion that substantive international criminal law exists. See Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis,Jus
Cogens and Offenses Erga Omnes?, 35 NEw ENG. L. RiV. 265, 267 n.8 (2001). The
amorphousness of the community contributes to the possibility that some states
will persistently object to formation of some customary norms. For a discussion of
the effect of this, see infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by

the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/236 (1946) (recognizing establishment of international military tribunals
for use in prosecuting war criminals in Europe and Far East).
89. See, e.g., Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, paras. 31-49 (stating
which rules of international criminal law Secretary General believes have become
customary beyond all doubt); see also Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, para. 17, 18, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc.

S/2000/915 (2000) [hereinafter Sierra Leone Report].
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definition of customary crimes would prove necessary and, as discussed
below as the fourth source of prescriptive authority, gave the ICC itself a
role in defining its substantive criminal law.
Professor Bassiouni, one of the driving forces behind the creation of
the ICC, has suggested another way in which the international community
as a whole is a prescriptive source for the law of the ICC. He argues that
general principles of law recognized in the legal systems of the world contribute to the "general part" of international criminal law (i.e., general
principles of criminality and exculpation). 90 "General principles of law
derived by the Court from the national laws of legal systems of the world
including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime" are indeed part of the sources of law
to which the Court may look in the absence of rules provided in the ICC
Statute, other documents of the Court and applicable treaties and principles and rules of international law (presumably meaning international custom). 9 ' That is, the Court may apply general principles of law in
determining cases where other sources of substantive criminal law do not
provide an answer. This is particularly clear in the case of defenses to
crime. 92 The general principles of law used by the Court may not be inconsistent "with th[e] Statute and with international law and internation93
ally recognized norms and standards."
The law of the States that might normally exercise jurisdiction in a
case is one of the sources used in determining general principles. The law
of those States is not, however, given priority over the law of other States in
the text of the Statute. One of the reasons to create the ICC was to provide a global voice to enunciate international criminal law. This goal
would be undermined if the legal principles applied in different cases varied, depending upon the place of the alleged crime. For example, unlike
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the ICC Statute does not require the Court to
look to the sentencing practices of the States where the crime occurred in
94
determining the sentence for that crime.
90. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Discipline of ICL [International Criminal Law]
Paper presented to World Conference on International Criminal Law: Quo Vadis,
International Institute for Higher Studies in the Criminal Sciences (Nov. 29,
2002). Prof. Bassiouni was Chair of the Drafting Committee at the Rome Conference of Plenipotentiaries that drafted the ICC Statute.
91. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, available at http://www.icj-cij.org (last visited May
30, 2003) (including general principles of law among sources of law for ICJ).
92. See id. art. 31(3) (stating grounds for excluding criminal responsibility
may be developed by Court on basis of sources of law listed in art. 21).
93. Id. art. 21(1).
94. Compare ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 76-78, with Statute of the International [Criminal] Tribunal [for the Former Yugoslavia], art. 24, Annex to Secretary-General's Report, art. 4 [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (incorporating serious
violations of Protocol No. II, supra note 76); see also ICTR Statute, supra note 75,
art. 23.
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The second source of prescriptive authority is the States adopting the
ICC Statute, a subset of the entire international community. While the
U.N. Security Council accepted the recommendation of the Secretary
General to give the ICTYjurisdiction only over those crimes undoubtedly
a part of customary international law, the Rome Conference that finalized
the ICC Statute had no such constraints. 95 It was a conference of representatives of States that could agree as they wished upon definitions of
international crimes.
The ICC Statute was intended by many to mark a progressive evolution of the substantive criminal law, as well as to provide a fair international forum for trying accused international criminals. 96 In fact, a few of
the crimes included in the ICC Statute do not appear to be customary
crimes. For example, Secretary General of the U.N. Kofi Annan believes
that the recruitment or enlistment of child soldiers (those under the age
of fifteen) is prohibited by customary international law, but that it may or
may not be "customarily recognized as a war crime entailing.., individual
criminal responsibility." 9 7 Thus, it is not clear whether the ICC Statute's
prohibition of conscripting or enlisting children into armed forces is a
restatement of customary law or the creation of a new international
crime. 98 Similarly, crimes against the environment committed during wartime, prohibited as war crimes by the ICC Statute, 99 may not currently be
considered international crimes under customary international law. They
are not crimes that have been taken into the domestic law of every state
holding membership in the U.N. 11 0
Some believe that the ICC Statute goes further than adding a few
crimes at the margins of international criminal law. Professor Sadat ar95. Formally, the conference was known as "U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court." See
Press Release, U.N. Diplomatic Conference to Establish International Criminal
Court to Convene in Rome, 15 June - 17 July (June 8, 1998), available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980608.12867.html.
96. To this extent, Leila N. Sadat and S.R. Carden's view of the ICC statute is
clearly correct. For more information about the perspectives of Leila N. Sadat and
S.R. Carden, see supra note 10.
97. See Sierra Leone Report, supra note 89, para. 17 (stating existence of
crime under international law of conscription of children).
98. See id. para. 18; see also ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 8(2)(b)(xxvi),
(e) (vii).
99. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2) (b) (iv).
100. There is little state practice punishing these acts as war crimes under
international law. On the other hand, protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions prohibits employment of "methods or means of warfare which are intended,
or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment." See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I),June 8, 1977, art. 35(3) (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
Given the variety of definitions of crimes against humanity, one might see in certain cases an argument that an alleged crime against humanity is not a customary
international crime. Cf supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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gues that "drafting the Statute required clarifying and elucidating the precise content of [offenses] in a way that often moved the 'law' of the Statute
far beyond existing customary international law understandings."' "1
. The States becoming parties to the ICC Statute appear to be creating
treaty-based crimes, as well as explicating in a treaty the boundaries of
crimes existing in customary international law. This falls within their prescriptive power, at least regarding the authority to create crimes among
themselves. 1102
The States actually ratifying the ICC Statute act as the formal
lawmaker. The States attending the Rome Conference, which created the
text of the ICC Statute, did not thereby make criminal law for anyone.
The Rome Conference, instead, made treaty law relevant to the ICC Statute. For example, it set up the conditions under which states could ratify
the Statute (e.g., no reservations are permitted), and set out the conditions under which the Statute would take effect (sixty ratifications
needed), by including these matters in the text that the Conference
wrote. 10 3 The Statute is open for ratification or accession by all States,
whether or not present at the Rome Conference. Many of those in attendance at the Rome Conference, such as China, India, the United States,
Indonesia and Russia (in order of population), have not ratified the Statute, and do not have the rights and obligations of ratifying states.
The ICC Statute, however, envisions an exercise of jurisdiction well
beyond the authority of States to arrange matters among themselves including criminal law matters. The ICC Statute is coming into effect with
ratification by more than sixty States. These do not include some of the
most populous and most powerful nations. By itself, the Statute cannot be
said to create new customary international crimes if one is to treat "custom" in the traditional sense of requiring a general consensus or, at least,
"general acquiescence." 104
The third lawmaker in the scheme of the ICC Statute is the U.N. Security Council. The Statute is intended to create a Court that will have
jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the territory of states party to it
101. SADAr, supra note 10, at 12.
102. See 101 IMTFE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 62, at 48440, 48442-47; see also
Randall, supra note 12, at 820-21 (explaining that treaty may legitimately grant all
states adhering to it jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations of international crime
occurring within their borders and discussing multilateral treaties, such as Convention against Torture, in context of right of states, not individuals, to object to exercise of criminal jurisdiction over their nationals).
103. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 120, 125, 126.
104. See Manley 0. Hudson (Special Rapporteur), Article 24 of the Statute of
the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16, Working Paper, 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM. 5 (March 1950). To the extent that Leila N. Sadat and S.R. Carden
argue that all the crimes in the ICC statute are intended to be customary, this
Article disagrees with them or, at least, argues that, regardless of intention, mere
naming of a crime in the ICC statute does not necessarily make it customary. For a
further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 114-17, 241-43 and accompanying
text.
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and over nationals of states not party to it, whenever the Security Council
refers a situation to the Court. Any situation facing the Court may involve
actors who are not nationals of a State that is party to the ICC Statute. The
legitimacy of applying crimes defined only by adopting states in situations
such as this one is discussed below, because distinctions among varying
situations are necessary.10 5
For now, the following suffices: Where a matter has been referred by
the Security Council, the ICC may attempt to prosecute treaty-based
crimes concerning States not party to the ICC Statute. If the Court does
so, it will be accepting the theory that the Security Council, in the exercise
of its powers to preserve or restore international peace and security, has
jurisdiction to prescribe new criminal law. 10 6 This is the major issue the
Secretary General avoided addressing when recommending the ICTYs
creation. 10 7 Moreover, the referral scheme of the ICC Statute regularizes
the exercise of the Security Council's jurisdiction to prescribe that a certain court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate cases arising from a given
situation.
Fourth, as an international organization and a court, the ICC will
have a residual jurisdiction to prescribe. This jurisdictional authority does
not include the power to define wholly new crimes 0 8 but does encompass
the ability to specify Elements of Crimes and, thus, to define the crimes
named in the ICC Statute more clearly. This authority is given to the Assembly of States Parties, a body of State representatives that oversees the
Court.' 0 9 The Court itself, as ajudicial body, is explicitly given the authority to use its own prior cases to determine the law.' 1 0 Again, this does not
105. For further discussion ofjurisdiction where the accused has no relevant
connection with a state that is party to the ICC statute, see infra notes 262-336 and
accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of the role of the Security Council in the possible creation of the international crime of "terrorism," see supra Part II(E).
107. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, para. 34.
108. The States that are party to the ICC Statute will work on defining the
crime of aggression, but the court will only have jurisdiction to preside over claims
of aggression pursuant to an amendment of the statute. See ICC Statute, supra note
1, arts. 5(2), 121, 123.
109. The Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, a
temporary U.N. body designated to provide drafts of several important documents
needed to implement the Statute, has prepared Draft Elements of Offenses. See
FinalizedDraft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2
(2000); Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Establishment of an InternationalCriminal Court, Annex I, Res. F, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/10
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm [hereinafter FinalAct, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries];see DONAT-CATIrIN, Supra note 85 (same); SADAT,
supra note 10, at 98-103, 293 (same); see also generally Gallant, supra note 3 (commenting on role of Assembly of States Parties in structure of ICC). The Elements
of Offenses have now been adopted by the Assembly of States Parties. See ICCASP/1/3, supra note 85, at 5, 108.
110. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(2). In fact, the ICTY and ICTR are
already using precedent in this manner without explicit authorization in their respective statutes. See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/l-T, Judgment, paras. 107-
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create the authority to legislate new crimes but does include the power to
clarify the definition of crimes included in the Statute, which ultimately
has the effect of prescribing what acts will be adjudicated as falling within
or outside the definition of crimes. Thus, both political and judicial authorities in the ICC will participate in the definition of crimes in the
Court.
Prescription by an international criminal tribunal, especially the modern ad hoc tribunals or the proposed ICC, is somewhat different in international law than prescription by a common law domestic court. Common
law courts have some law-making authority within their own systems, but,
for international law purposes, this authority is assimilated to other lawmaking functions of the same sovereign. By contrast, when law is declared
by one of the new international criminal tribunals, the judges are acting
not as agents of any government but as officers of an international organization. 1 1 For the most part, their substantive criminal law does not arise
out of the acts of the international organization itself but from its founding treaty or from customary international law. However, to the extent
that they define crimes, defenses and procedures, and use their own
precedents as law, the international organizations will themselves make
law.
When either customary international law or general principles of law
must be interpreted in order to decide a case, the ICC will be the actor
applying them, a fact that is recognized in text of the Statute. The Court's
prescriptive role is more active and immediate than that of the international community as a whole, whose actions the Court will be interpreting
and the judges deciding cases will be acting for the Court, not on behalf of
any State.
The Assembly of States Parties, when it adopts or amends the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, acts somewhat
differently from the community of States that adopted the ICC Statute.
The Assembly acts as part of an international organization, not as a set of
individual, sovereign States. The Elements and Rules may be adopted
1 2
non-unanimously-by a two-thirds vote.'
The conceptualization of jurisdiction to prescribe enunciated here
evolves from traditional notions of jurisdiction in international law. It
09 (ICTY App. Ch., 24 Mar. 2000); Kambanda v. Prosecutor, ICTR 97-23-A, Judgment, paras. 49-95 (ICTR App. Ch., 19 Oct. 2000); Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S.
Gallant, Appeals in the Ad Hoc InternationalCriminal Tribunals: Structure, Practice and
Recent Cases, 3J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 589, 632-35 (2001).
111. In the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, by contrast, the judges did have
status with their own governments.
112. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 112(7) (requiring two-thirds majority if
consensus cannot be reached). Modification of the Elements and Rules in response to Court decisions may serve as a quasi-legislative check on the lawmaking
authority of the Court. This may alleviate some of the concerns expressed in Morris, supra note 17, at 32-33, about the difficulty of revising law developed by the
Court.
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does not abandon core notions that states are primarily responsible for
making international criminal law, as other kinds of international law,
through the treaty and custom creation processes. Nor does it abandon
the notion that there must be some connection between the prescribing
authority and those individuals for whom acts are proscribed.11 3 It develops the traditional understanding by recognizing that international organizations-specifically, the ICC and the Security Council-have some
prescriptive authority.
This theory of prescription is more conservative and evolutionary in
international law terms than that proposed by certain other commentators.' 1 4 Some view the ICC Statute as a defining constitutional moment in
international law and a key moment in a process by which the identity of
the makers of international law is radically changing. They argue that the
U.N. Charter creates a "constitution" for the international community,
which cannot be ignored by non-Party states. The creation of the ICC is
part of the development of the U.N. system, as it has been created through
the efforts of U.N. bodies including the Rome Conference,11 5 the Preparatory Commission and before them the International Law Commission. Finally, the law of the ICC Statute "is clearly intended to have the status of
custom and even of jus cogens obligations."' 16
One advantage of the more conservative view is that it corresponds
more closely with the political reality of the new Court. It is difficult to
imagine that a constitutional moment in international law has passed without the membership in the ICC of nine of the world's ten most populous
countries (Brazil being the only exception), especially a moment that
would drastically change the general lawmaking process for the international community. Customary international law that necessarily concerns
all States (as is true of international humanitarian law in general) cannot
be created with so many major nations dissenting or, at least, abstaining.
The more conservative view will likely be more acceptable to those
political leaders whose support, overt or tacit, is necessary to the success of
the ICC and to the project of developing an international criminal law to
protect fundamental humanitarian values. Some major states not now
party to the ICC Statute and, in particular, China, India, the United States
and Russia, frequently rely on a view of international law and politics
based on the traditional sovereign equality of states. Unless and until
these attitudes change, each country is less likely to cooperate with the
project of the Court to the extent that it is seen as a revolutionary reshaping of the international political and legal order.
113. For a further discussion of the ICC'sjurisdiction to adjudicate, see infra
notes 203-336 and accompanying text.
114. See Sadat, supra note 10, at 406-09.
115. For further discussion of the Rome Conference, see supra note 90.
116. Sadat, supra note 10, at 409-10 n.167. For more information about the
intention behind the ICC Statute, see infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, as demonstrated below, almost all of the substantive criminal law results sought by the Court's supporters can be obtained using a
more traditional view of the sources of prescriptive authority in the ICC
regime. Indeed, this Article questions the fairness of results that fall
outside those obtainable under more traditional views." 17 To this extent,
additional claims concerning lawmaking authority may prove detrimental
to human rights concerns in the administration of criminal justice.
E.

The Security Council and the International Crime of "Terrorism"

Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, the
U.N. Security Council "decid[ed] that all States shall" criminalize the willful financing of terrorist acts and ensure that terrorist acts are established
as serious criminal offenses in their own domestic law, as well as take other
1 18
specific acts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts and their financing.
It also "called upon all States to" become parties to international conventions to prevent terrorism and to fully implement them.' 1 9
Professor Swart has described this action as the creation of a new international crime of terrorism. 120 He argues that the Security Council
made terrorism an international crime akin to slave trading or piracy, because international law requires or allows states to criminalize these acts.
He conceptualizes these crimes somewhat differently from those such as
genocide and crimes against humanity. Genocide and crimes against humanity are crimes under customary international law itself. 12 1 Further, he
argues there is a difference between terrorism on the one hand and piracy
and slavery on the other. Customary international law "obliges or autho12
rizes all states to criminalize [piracy and slavery] in their domestic laws," 2
but the obligation to make terrorism a crime is derived from an international organization, the U.N., acting through a small subset of its mem123
bers, the Security Council.
To the extent a new international crime has been created, the Security Council has gone beyond the role that it set for itself in creating the
117. For an argument.that it is unfair to apply new, non-customary crimes to
persons who have no reason to believe the criminal prohibition applies to them,
see infra Parts V(B) and VI(B).
118. See S.C. Res. 1373, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. No. S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001).
119. See id.
120. See Bert Swart, International Crimes: Present Situation and Future Development, Paper presented to World Conference on International Criminal Law:

Quo Vadis, International Institute for Higher Studies in the Criminal Sciences
(November 30, 2002); Szasz, supra note 1.
121. See Swart, supra note 120, at 1.
122. Id.
123. He contrasts this with the European Union, which he characterizes as an
international organization, which can require its members to criminalize certain
acts, because decisions like this in the E.U. require acquiescence of all members.
See id.
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ICTY and ICTR. In creating those tribunals, it used its Chapter VII authority to restore and maintain international peace and security by giving
international courts jurisdiction over crimes that it believed already existed in international customary law or (in the case of the ICTR) in treaty
law binding the relevant states.
By contrast, in its action on terrorism, the Security Council used its
Chapter VII authority to require States to make certain acts criminal
within their domestic law. The Security Council has acted as though it has
power to legislate, or at least to require members of the U.N. to legislate,
certain criminal laws. It thus burst the bonds it appeared to impose on
itself in creating the ad hoc tribunals.
This action of the Security Council was not viewed as extremely controversial. Killing of innocent non-combatants, hostage-taking and other
acts generally considered terrorist, along with aiding and abetting them
with financing, were already criminal in the laws of almost all States. The
real question was, and remains, whether these laws, especially the laws
against the financing of terrorist acts, can or will be effectively enforced,
124
either within national systems or through international cooperation.
Additionally, the Security Council avoided controversy by avoiding to define terrorism.
Because the Security Council did not purport to define terrorism and
because the substantive criminal law it requires States to adopt is not new,
one may question whether it was truly creating a new international crime
in its post-September 11th actions. Yet the Security Council acted as
though it does have legislative authority to create criminal law, if the creation of that law would lead to restoration and maintenance of international peace and security.
Whether the Security Council will continue to act in this way, especially by taking on the difficult task of defining crimes not already common to most legal orders, remains to be seen. 12 5 If it does so successfully,
the role of the U.N. as an international organization in the making of
international criminal law would undergo a transformation. The obstacles
to this general law creation authority-including the less-than-fully-representative nature of the Security Council-remain large.
III.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE AD

Hoc TRIBUNALS

Until recently, personal jurisdiction, whether to prescribe or to adjudicate, was not an especially troublesome problem for the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Even now,
the problems posed are not as complex as may arise from the ICC Statute.
124. Security Council Resolution 1373 recognizes the need for international
law enforcement cooperation against terrorism and its financing. For further discussion of the international criminal tribunal's role against terrorism, see supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
125. See Swart, supra note 120, at 2.
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This situation occurs largely because of the limited territorial and temporal jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals and because of the care that was
1 26
taken in defining the crimes within their subject matter jurisdiction.
The statutes of the tribunals expressly discuss jurisdiction to adjudicate. The tribunals have jurisdiction only over "natural persons," and not
over governmental entities, political parties, corporations or other non127
governmental entities.
The ICTY and ICTR statutes also discuss what they call the
"[t]erritorial and temporal jurisdiction" of the tribunals.' 28 The "territorial"jurisdiction of the ICTY extends "to the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including its land surface, airspace and
territorial waters. 1 29 The jurisdiction of the ICTR extends to "the territory of Rwanda including its land surface and airspace, as well as to the
territory of neighboring States in respect of serious violations of interna0
tional humanitarian law committed by Rwandan citizens. 1 3
The last portion of the ICTR provision is a limitation on jurisdiction
to adjudicate for acts in neighboring states, granting the ICTRjurisdiction
only over Rwandan citizens. The remaining portions of both provisions
are easily characterized as limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of the
tribunals. The provisions as a whole, given how they have been applied in
deciding who may be prosecuted, have made issues of personal jurisdiction reasonably straightforward. The prosecution has not pushed cases
involving the complicated issues of "effects" jurisdiction, where an accused
acts in one place and impacts another locale, which could conceivably
13
arise under the ICC Statute.
Similarly the temporal provisions, combined with a careful definition
of crimes, has limited the likelihood of nulla crimen sine lege problems arising in these tribunals. 132 In the ICTY, only serious violations of international humanitarian law occurring after 1991 may be prosecuted. In the
ICTR, only crimes occurring in 1994 may be prosecuted. As discussed
above, crimes in each statute were defined to implement international law
applying to the relevant State during the relevant time period. 133 In these
126. For a discussion of the ICC, see supra Part 11(D) and infra Parts IV-VI.
127. See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 6; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 75,
art. 5. In contrast, the Nuremberg Charter allowed organizations to be declared
criminal in certain instances. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 37, arts. 9, 10; see
alsoJONES, supra note 76, at 121-22, 500.
128. See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 8; ICTR Statute, supra note 75, art. 7.
129. See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 8.
130. Id.
131. For a discussion of the theory that crimes having an effect on the territory of a State Party to the ICC Statute may create jurisdiction, see infra Part
V(B)(1).
132. For possible situations in the ICC, see infra Part VI(B) (2).
133. For a discussion of the International Criminal Court, see supra Part
II(D). There is one possible counterexample in the cases that have been tried. In
Prosecutor v. Furundzija,the Trial Chamber characterizes "rape" as a crime under
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situations, there is no unfairness in submitting persons to the jurisdiction
of the ad hoc tribunals.

Some matters characterized as issues of personal jurisdiction have
arisen from allegedly unfair treatment of the accused. They address jurisdiction to adjudicate where serious procedural irregularities occur.
The recent arrest and problematic transfer of former Yugoslavian
president Slobodan Milosevic has spawned an important issue of jurisdiction to adjudicate in the ICTY. The Trial Chamber of the ICTY recently
13 4
decided this issue, and the trial of President Milosevic is ongoing.
President Milosevic claims that he was transferred to the ICTY in vio-

lation of the national law of Yugoslavia, and that this fact vitiates the
ICTY's jurisdiction over him. The Trial Chamber rejected this assertion

on the ground that Yugoslavia had an international law obligation to surrender him to the tribunal and that national law could not be used to
evade that responsibility.'3 Though a proper conclusion, the case raises a
troubling spectre of the traditional international law doctrine: the illegality of obtaining the presence of a defendant, even by kidnapping, does not
affect the jurisdiction of a court over a person. This concern is further
discussed below, under parallel but not identical provisions of the ICC

Statute.136
Another case presenting issues regarding personal jurisdiction, this
time in the ICTR Appeals Chamber, is Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza.1 37 The
international law but states that that law has not defined it. See Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, IT-95-17/1, judgment (ICTY Trial Ch., 10 Dec. 1998), paras. 174-86
(discussing sources of law to define rape). The Trial Chamber then goes on to
define it using general principles of law found in many national law systems. See id.
This issue does not appear on appeal. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/1, Judgment (ICTY, App. Ch., 21 July 2000). This failure is a bit surprising, given that it
would be hard to justify a claim that a crime exists without any definition whatsoever. It would, however, be reasonable to argue that the Trial Chamber's statement that there is no definition of rape in international law is simply a mistake.
The Trial Chamber should have recognized that it was actually applying international law when it defined rape using general principles of law, so long as the
predicates existed for charging these particular rapes as war crimes. Cf Statute of
the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (c), June 26, 1945 (providing that
"general principles of law accepted by civilized nations" are source of international
law); ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1) (general principles of law may be used
when other sources listed in ICC Statute fail).
134. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, Case No.
IT-02-54 (ICTY Trial Ch., 2001), para. 7.
135. See id. para. 47. One difficulty that the ICTY has in this case is that President Milosevic has decided to proceed without counsel, and the tribunal has
agreed to allow him to do so. Still, the tribunal has appointed experienced counsel as amicus curiae to make appropriate legal arguments. Therefore, it is sometimes necessary when discussing this case to use the passive voice, such as "the
claim is," rather than the active voice, "Milosevic claims."
136. For a discussion of the doctrine that the illegality of the person's presence does not affect jurisdiction, see infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
137. Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Decision, Case No. ICTR-97-19 (ICTR App.
Ch., 3 Nov. 1999), para. 72, available at http://www.ictr.org/.
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Appeals Chamber initially dismissed the indictment in this case with
prejudice after the court held that delays in the prosecution occurring
during Mr. Barayagwiza's imprisonment were unfair. The Appeals Chamber, in taking the interlocutory appeal, necessarily decided that the delays
138
impugned the tribunal's jurisdiction over the person.
This discussion was short circuited by the subsequent decision of the
Appeals Chamber to revise its judgment and to refuse to dismiss the indictment on the asserted ground that new facts had been discovered that absolved the prosecution of responsibility for much of the delay in bringing
the case to trial. 13 9 This newer decision goes to great lengths not to repudiate what was said concerning the law in the original decision and, in14
stead, justifies its new ruling based on newly presented facts. 0
Both the Milosevic and Barayagwiza cases raise the question whether
procedural violations, particularly those involving the human rights of an
accused, can vitiate an international criminal tribunal's jurisdiction to adjudicate. These cases alone do not provide a full answer. One suggestion
follows: A serious violation of the human rights of the accused should be
given an appropriate remedy depending upon the violation, regardless of
whether the matter is characterized as jurisdictional.14 1 Such violations
should be characterized as impugning jurisdiction to adjudicate only
where the violation concerns how the accused was brought before the
Court for adjudication, such as by kidnapping. With this shift, the procedures of international criminal tribunals must be adjusted to include devices to correct ongoing human rights violations, regardless of how they
are characterized.
As an example, a case should be dismissed where the violation makes
continuing with a fair proceeding in a tribunal impossible, as where a very
long delay before trial prevents the accused from presenting substantial
evidence. A tribunal should reach this result because of the substantive
violation of the rights of the accused, even though the error may not be
characterized as jurisdictional.

138. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Decision, Case No. ICTR-97-19 (ICTR
App. Ch., 3 Nov. 1999), para. 72, available at http://www.ictr.org/; International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72, U.N.
Doc. ITR/3/Rev.10 (2001) (noting that interlocutory appeals are available concerning only jurisdiction or pretrial release).
139. See Barayagawiza,Decision of Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72 (ICTR App. Ch., 31 March 2000), available
at http://www.ictr.org. Many, including some of the Appeals Chamber, saw this as
more of a political than ajudicial revision necessary to secure the Rwandan government's cooperation with the tribunal.
140. See id. paras. 51, 52.
141. Cf ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 21 (providing that law must be applied
in accordance with internationally recognized human rights); see also SAFFERLING,
supra note 2, at 16-17.
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GENERAL STATEMENT AND LIMITS OF JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE IN
THE

ICC

STATUTE

The provisions of the ICC Statute governing jurisdiction to adjudicate, as well as other jurisdictional issues introduced above, are complex.
This Part will consider general issues of jurisdiction to adjudicate and immunities from it. Issues concerning both jurisdiction to adjudicate and to
prescribe that are specific to the manner in which the Court receives a
case (by referral from a state or proprio motu investigation by the Prosecutor on the one hand, and by Security Council referral on the other) are
142
discussed in later Parts of this Article.
A. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Its Limits

The ICC Statute specifically defines the word "jurisdiction" as the authority to make decisions concerning an accused or a suspected personthat is, jurisdiction to adjudicate. First, Part 1, addressing the "Establishment of the Court," states that the Court "shall be a permanent institution
and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute . .. [and] [t]he jurisdiction ... of the Court shall be governed by the
provisions of this Statute." 143 Later, Part 3, addressing "General Principles
of Criminal Law," delimits the general principle of jurisdiction to adjudicate a bit further, granting 'jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to
[the] Statute."
Additionally, the statute adds: "The Court shall have no jurisdiction
over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged
commission of a crime." 144 This age requirement may be equally well
characterized either as a matter of personal jurisdiction (as was in fact
done) or as a ground for excluding personal responsibility, generally considered under the rubric of the substantive part of criminal law.1 45 One
142. See infra Parts V (discussing state referral and proprio motu investigation)
and VI (discussing Security Council referral).
143. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
144. See id. art. 26.

145. See id. art. 31. In fact, the Preparatory Committee's drafts of the ICC
Statute considered the issue ofjuveniles who commit acts within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court under the rubric of personal responsibility rather than
personal jurisdiction. See Roger S. Clark & Otto Triffterer, Article 26, Exclusion of

Jurisdiction over Persons under Eighteen, in

COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE

494-97 (Otto Triffterer ed. 1999) [hereinafter

OBSERVERS' NOTES];

493,

see also SADAT,

supra note 10, at 105-06. Professors Clark & Triffterer and Sadat point out that
because juvenile crimes are treated as matters of personal jurisdiction rather than
criminal responsibility, the statute does not suggest that national courts or other
international courts should treat all persons under the age of eighteen as not criminally responsible for international crimes. See Clark & Triffterer, supra, at 499;
accord SADAT, supra note 10, at 105-06 (citing Per Saland, InternationalCriminal Law
Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 189, 201 (Roy S. Lee, ed. 1999)). In fact, the new joint national/international
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might also say that only a person over the age of eighteen has the capacity
to commit a crime within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. The
language ofjurisdiction to adjudicate is used both in the definition of who
may be brought before the Court (i.e., natural persons) and which natural
persons are excluded because of age. This demonstrates that the concept
of jurisdiction to adjudicate is part of the intellectual framework of the
ICC Statute.
The placement of these statements about jurisdiction over natural
persons is somewhat unusual. They are located in Part 3 of the Statute
("General Principles of Criminal Law"), 146 rather than in Part 2 ('Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law"). 147 Presumably, this choice was
made because personal jurisdiction is closely related to issues of personal
responsibility, which dominate Part 3.148
The Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate is limited to individuals. It does
not extend to governments, political parties, business entities or other associations. 149 The ICC Statute follows the statutes of the ad hoc Interna5 0°
tional Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.'
All these documents depart from the practice under the Charter of the
Nuremburg Tribunal, which allowed organizations to be declared criminal.151 The theory of the ICC Statute is that it is individuals, not abstract
Special Court for Sierra Leone has been given jurisdiction over juveniles down to
age 15. See Special Court Statute, supra note 11, art. 7.
146. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 22-33.
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, para. 53 (treating
principles of individual criminal responsibility as "important element[s] in relation
to ... competence ratione personae (personal jurisdiction)").
149. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25; JORGENSEN, supra note 39, at 72-88

(discussing criminality of corporations and states). Rule of Procedure and Evidence 85 defines victims to include entities other than individuals and states. See
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 85, ICC-ASP/1/3, supra note 85, at 52.
This is a potentially important development in the international legal personality
of non-state entities, which unfortunately cannot be adequately discussed in this
Article.
150. See ICTY Statute, supranote 94, art. 6; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 75,
art. 5. The language in the two ad hoc statutes is parallel, each stating that the
respective tribunal shall "have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the
provisions of the present Statute." See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 6; see also
ICTR Statute, supra note 75, art. 5.
151. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 37, art. 6; see also Nuremberg Judgment, supranote 38, at 171. The Nuremberg Charter allowed prosecutions of individuals under article 6, but allowed the court to declare organizations of which
those individuals were members criminal organizations. See Nuremberg Charter,
supra note 37, art. 9. The indictment of the major war criminals asked that certain
organizations, both political and governmental, be declared criminal. The NurembergJudgment declared some of these organizations to be criminal but recognized
the possible problems of overreaching occurring where the organizations themselves were not defendants. See id. Likewise, the Nuremberg Judgment also revealed a concern that declaring an organization criminal might have legal effects
for currently uncharged and untried members. See id.
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entities, who commit crimes. '5 2 Moreover, limiting responsibility to individuals reduces the likelihood of limiting freedom of association or punishing criminally the mere holding or advocacy of political views. Finally,
because organizational criminal liability is not well developed in all States,
limiting liability to individuals promotes cohesion between the Court and
national legal systems and prevents some issues of comparative law from
153
complicating the Court's task.
Failure to include associations, corporations, political parties and governments as entities that can fall within the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate may seriously reduce the effectiveness of the restitution and
restorative justice provisions of the ICC Statute.' 54 In modern economies,
much of the wealth that may justly be used for purposes of restorative
justice is legally held by such entities. 155 The only portion of this wealth
under the reach of the ICC Statute is that portion owned by a convicted
individual; for example, an individual's personal shares in a corporation.
Even wealth that inured to the corporation because of the individual's
wrongdoing cannot be seized, so long as it does not belong to the convicted individual. The wealth ofjuridical persons not "owned" by individuals cannot be subjected to the Court's jurisdiction. In most countries,
government agencies, non-governmental organizations and political parties are not seen as subject to ownership by individuals. Despite the crippling limitations imposed on the restitutionary scheme of the Statute, this
political choice was made and can be changed only by future amendment
to the ICC Statute.
This does not complete the personal jurisdiction analysis, which will
vary depending on the source of the referral of the situation to the Court.
152. See Nuremberg.Judgment, supra note 38. In the new statutes, this reasoning is used as a basis for excluding organizational liability, but the Nuremberg
opinion condemned the leadership corps of the National Socialist German Workers Party and other groups as criminal organizations. See id.
153. See Kai Ambos, Article 25, Individual CriminalResponsibility, in OBSERVERS'
supra note 145, at 475, 478.

NOTES,

154. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 75, 79 (discussing reparations and
trust funds as remedies).
155. See Ambos, supra note 153, at 477-78 n.9, (citing U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/C.1/L.3 (1998), art. 23, paras. 5, 6 and providing French delegation's
unsuccessful argument in negotiations leading LIp to ICC Statute's adoption). The
current ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda allow recovery
of property wrongfully taken from a victim or its proceeds "even in the hands of
third parties not otherwise connected with the crime of which the convicted person has been found guilty." ICTY, Rules of Procedureand Evidencefor the International

Criminal Tibunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, Rule 105(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV.24

(2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpe/IT32_rev20con.htm; ICTR,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 105(B), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.10 (2001); see
also Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in

Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1221, 1321-22 (2000). Neither the ICC Statute nor its
draft rules clearly allow for this kind of seizure. Cf ICC Statute, supra note 1; see
also Draft Rules, supra note 149.
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While this is discussed more fully below, 156 a few words may be useful
here. The Rome Conference made a political decision to include highly
technical limitations on the Court's jurisdiction when a situation is referred to the Prosecutor by a State or an investigation is begun by the
Prosecutor proprio motu. These limitations do not arise in cases where the
U.N. Security Council refers a situation to the Prosecutor. 15 7 The ICC
Statute itself governs the Court's jurisdiction over persons. 158 General international law doctrine only assists in interpreting the Statute. Even if
universal personal jurisdiction over those accused of heinous customary
international crime is or becomes the law in national courts, the ICC Stat59
ute controls whether the Court could exercise such jurisdiction.'
The political decision to make personal jurisdiction broader in Security Council-referred cases than in cases referred by a party State or investigated by the Prosecutor proprio motu is understandable in light of the ICC's
status as an international organization. Where the Security Council refers
a case to the ICC, the Council can impose a duty to cooperate with the
ICC on all U.N. member States. 16 0 In cases referred by a State Party or a
Prosecutor's proprio motu investigation, however, the ICC, as an international organization, cannot impose obligations on States that have not
consented to the obligations. Normally, an international organization, established by a constitutive treaty, cannot impose obligations on States not
party to the treaty or States that have otherwise not consented to be
bound. Without a Security Council referral, the Court has no basis for
exercising personal jurisdiction over individuals without sufficient connections to a consenting State.
Nothing in the ICC Statute purports to prevent States from exercising
universal jurisdiction over those accused of the most serious international
crimes, however. Indeed, the Statute expressly limits its development of
16 1
international law to the issues addressed in the Statute itself.
156. For further discussion of the personal jurisdiction analysis, see infra Parts
V and VI.
157. CompareICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12, 13(a), 13(c) (discussing situations referred by state or investigated proprio motu), with id. art. 13(b) (examining
situations referred by Security Council).
158. See id. art. 1.
159. The ICC Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Elements
of Crimes are the primary sources of law for the court, subject to consistency with
internationally recognized human rights. Principles and rules of international law
and principles of law derived from national laws are lower in the hierarchy of law
to be applied in the court. See id. arts. 21(1), (3).
160. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the U.N., Advisory
Opinion, 1949 ICJ Rep. 175 (1949). For a further discussion of the U.N. Charter
in this context, see infra Part VI(B).
161. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 10 ("Nothing in this [section on jurisdiction and applicable law] shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any
way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this
Statute."). This is not wholly dispositive because the articles referring directly to
personal jurisdiction are in other sections of the statute. Nothing in those parts,
however, suggests a different effect on international law outside the statute's in-
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The ICC Statute also limits jurisdiction by the time of commission of
the crime in a way that can be conceptualized as a limit on jurisdiction to
adjudicate. "No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute
for conduct prior to [its] entry into force ....,,162 This provision was
described by one respected commentator as a limit on 'jurisdiction ratione
personae."'16 3 Indeed, it states a limitation on jurisdiction in terms of persons and the time of their conduct. However, a similar temporal provision
elsewhere in the Statute is described in its heading as 'Jurisdiction ratione
temporis,"1 6 4 thus conceptualizing this matter separately from personal jurisdiction. That provision states that the Court may exercise its jurisdiction only as to "crimes committed after the entry into force" of the Statute;
or in the case of a State becoming a party to the Statute after its entry into
force, only as to "crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless the State has made a declaration [accepting its
jurisdiction for referrals by a party-State or investigations by the Prosecutor
proprio motu]." 16 5 The above mentioned provision may present a problem
1 66
concerning who the Court may prosecute and punish.
B.
1.

Immunities from Jurisdiction-Limitedbut Not Fully Abolished

Official Immunities Generally Abolished

One of the most important reasons for bringing the International
Criminal Court into existence was to end the "culture of impunity" by
which high government officials avoid criminal responsibility for their acts
by reason of their positions. Thus, an important part of the statutory
scheme is article 27, stating "official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility ....-167 To emphasize this point, the Statute restates it in
jurisdictional terms: "Immunities or special procedural rules which may
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or intertent. Cf id. art. 22 (explaining that principle of nulla crimen preventing court prosecution for non-statutory international crime does not prejudice characterization
of conduct as criminal independently of statute, such as in national courts). The
ICC Statute's preamble also contains a reference that does not exclude the application of universal jurisdiction by States: "[I] t is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes." See id.
preamble.
162. See id. art. 24(1).
163. See Sharon A. Williams, Article 11, JurisdictionRatione Temporis, in OBSERVERS' NOTES, supra note 145, at 323, 327.
164. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 11 (caption).
165. Id. art. 11 (referring to art. 12(3)).
166. For further discussion of whom the Court may prosecute and punish, see
infra Parts V(B) (2) and VI(C).
167. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 27(1).
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national law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over
168
such a person."
In contrast, the ICJ recently held that high government officials and
diplomats still have immunity under international law from prosecution in
the courts of States other than their own, even for crimes against humanity, at least while they are still in office. 169 Thus, the ICJ held that Belgium
had to void an arrest warrant obtained against a then-sitting foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for crimes against humanity.
The opinions of the ICJ judges distinguished between immunity, which
attaches to the person, often for a limited time, so that affairs of the State
may be conducted without interference, and impunity, which would absolve an official of criminal liability altogether. The ICJ specifically
pointed out that the result might be different in the ICC, because of the
170
ICC Statute provisions on immunity.
Despite the apparent wholesale abolition of immunity, 17 1 the ICC
Statute retains three important provisions which will effectively result in
temporary or permanent immunity from prosecution for some persons.
These are described below.
2.

Rights of Third States to Prevent Transfers

The first immunity exists in the ICC Statute's provisions concerning
how an accused is brought before the Court. A State is not required to
violate its obligations to third States in international law in order to hand
an accused (or evidence) over to the Court. The Court may not proceed
with a request for surrender of an individual which would "require the
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State" or would "require the requested State to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of the sending State is required to surrender a
person of that State to the Court .... -172 In all cases, the Court can seek a
waiver of these immunities from the third (or sending) State, and if it
173
receives the waiver, may proceed with the request to transfer.
There are a few common situations in which this immunity from
transfer might arise. These include diplomatic immunity, immunity from
re-transfer based on a prior extradition and immunity based in a Status of
Forces agreement between the requested State and the State of nationality
168. Id. art. 27(2).
169. See Arrest Warrant, supra note 6.
170. See id. para. 61.
171. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 27(2).
172. See id. art. 98(1), (2). Article 98 is concerned with protecting the inviolability of diplomatic property as well as persons. This may have consequences for
what may be obtained as evidence by the Court or turned over as restitution to
victims. See id.
173. See id.
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of the accused. 174 Generally, a State may not arrest and prosecute a diplomat from another State without the sending State's consent; that rule is
carried through here. Generally, bilateral extradition treaties require the
extradited person to be sent back to the extraditing country when the sentence is complete; the ICC Statute prohibits re-transfer to the Court without the extraditing State's permission by analogy to re-extradition to a
third State. 175 A Status of Forces agreement may prohibit a State from
sending members of the armed forces of another State to the ICC; these
are observed.
This last situation has been particularly controversial, because the
United States has sought such agreements with a number of States, and
has signed several. The United States would like agreements with European Union member States that would prohibit transfer of any United
States citizen to the ICC. The United States has also succeeded in placing
protective language requiring the ICC to defer prosecutions of
peacekeepers for twelve months (with an intention to renew the deferral)
176
in a Security Council Resolution.
This does not mean that the Court is deprived ofjurisdiction in these
cases. Under the prevailing conceptualization, immunities do not destroy
17 7
personal jurisdiction, but merely prevent a court from exercising it.
174. See Kimberley Prost & Angelika Schunk, Article 98, Cooperation with Re-

spect to Waiver of Immunity and Consent to Surrender,in OBSERVERS' NOTES, supra note
145, at 1131, 1132-33; see also KITlICHAISAREE, supra note 8, at 284; SCHABAS, supra
note 17, at 64, 92.
175. For a discussion of the differences between transfer to an international
court and extradition to another State, see GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, SURRENDERING -to INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COuRrS: CONTEMPORARY PRACICE AND PROCEDURES, Ch. 1 (Transnat'l Publishers 2002).
See generally Kenneth S. Gallant,
Obtaining the Presenceof Defendants in the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former
Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradition, 5 CRIM. L.F. 557 (1994).
176. According to the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, as of
May 21, 2003, 37 nations had signed so-called Article 98 bilateral agreements with
the United States including fourteen States Parties to the ICC Statute. See Documents on Impunity Agreements, at http://www.iccnow.org/otherissuesimpunityagreem.html (last visited May 23, 2003) (the current author does not agree with
the coalition for the ICC's characterization of these as "impunity" agreements For
further discussion on U.S. negotiations with E.U. members to exclude all U.S. citizens from transfer, see US Rejects EU Criminal Court Guidelines, BBC NEWS, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2291451.stm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). For an
argument that these U.S.-requested bilateral agreements go beyond the immunities authorized by ICC Statute Article 98, see Roger S. Clark, Challenges Confronting the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court,
Remarks at International Criminal Law Network Conference (The Hague, Dec. 1820, 2002), at 10-17. For the peacekeeping resolution, see S.C. Res. 1422, U.N.
SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572nd mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002) (applying ICC
Statute, art. 16). For a critique of the legality of Resolution 1422, see Amnesty
International, InternationalCriminalCourt: The unlawful Attempt by the Security Council
to give U.S. Citizens Permanent Impunity from InternationalJustice, Al Index: IOR 40/
006/2003 (May 2003).
177. See Arrest Warrant, supra note 6, para. 60; cf ICC Statute, supra note 1,
art. 27(2).
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The ICC may appropriately obtain the presence of the accused in another
way, and then it is free to proceed with the prosecution. For example, the
7
State in whose favor immunity exists may waive that immunity.1 3 Indeed,
if the State in whose favor the immunity exists is a party to the ICC Statute,
it probably has an obligation either to waive immunity, or to transfer the
1 79
This is because
person to the Court after repatriation to that State.
States parties have a general duty to "cooperate fully with the Court in the
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court."18 0 One might even say that all U.N. Members have a similar obligation of cooperation, in the case of a Security Council referral to the
18 1
This
Court, if the Security Council has requested such cooperation.
obligation, however, arises under the U.N. Charter, rather than directly
82
from the ICC Statute, which by itself cannot bind States not party to it.1
Moreover, where there is no Security Council referral, there is no obligation under the ICC Statute on a non-Party State to surrender or transfer
183
an accused to the ICC.
One difficult issue might arise if there is a surrender of an accused to
the Court that is improper under article 98 or appropriate national law.
Neither the ICC Statute nor the Rules contemplate this case. In general
criminal law, the propriety of the means of acquisition of the presence of
an accused is immaterial.' 8 4 Yet this tradition has been so heavily criti178. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 98.
179. See id. arts. 86-89, 92(4).
180. See id. art. 86. This would not, of course, prevent such a State from
claiming the right to investigate and prosecute the alleged crime in its own courts
pursuant to the complementarity provisions of the Statute. See id. art. 17.
181. CifS.C. Res. 827, para. 4, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 321.7th mtg., at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/827 (1993) (establishing ICTY); S.C. Res. 955 (1994), para. 2, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) (establishing
1CTR).
182. Cf infra Part VI(B).
183. See VCOLT, supra note 45, art. 34; see alvo ScHABAs, supra note 17, at 92
(suggesting that high officials of States not party to ICC Statute may continue to
claim immunity, apparently because article 27 abolishes immunities only for officials of States parties and article 98 allows States to object to transfers in violation
of obligations under international law). If Professor Schabas means that non-Party
States have no obligation to transfer their own officials to the ICC (at least in the
absence of a Security Council requirement), then it is true that this immunity exists. If, however, he means that an official of a non-Party State who has properly
come before the Court can make a valid claim of immunity, then Professor
Schabas may overstate the case. Immunity from jurisdiction under the law of the
official's State is valid in national law, not international law, except to the extent
required by Arrest Warrant, supra note 6. Thus, article 98 on its face would appear
not to apply unless there was an improper transfer of the official to the ICC from
the custody of another State, which by hypothesis there has not been. But cf Morris, supra note 17, at 44-45 (arguing that non-Party States have interest that are
impacted whenever State Party transfers citizen of non-Party State to ICC without
consent).
184. See generally United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding forcible abduction in foreign country by DEA does not prohibit trial in U.S.
criminal courts); Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (S.Ct. 1962) (supplying judg-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 2
806

[Vol. 48: p. 763

Vn.LANOVA LAW REVIEW

cized for so many good reasons, such as its apparent countenance of kidnapping, that the new ICC might well wish to reconsider whether it would
1
prosecute a person improperly brought before it.'

5

A similar claim was made by Slobodan Milosevic, as discussed above,
in the ICTY. 18 6 A claim of wrongful transfer like Milosevic's could be
stronger in the ICC than in the ICTY. The ICTY has supremacy over national tribunals, and relevant States have an international law obligation to
cooperate with it, regardless of internal law. 187 The ICC, by contrast, has a
jurisdiction complementary to that of States. The Statute indicates that
States should make transfers to the ICC "in accordance with the provisions
of this Part [9] and the procedure under their national law .... "188 States
parties to the ICC Statute will have a treaty law obligation not to use national law to avoid transfer. At least where the Security Council has required Member States of the U.N. to cooperate with the ICC, such states
will have a Charter-based obligation not to use national law to avoid
transfer.
Yet it is equally true that the Court may not circumvent either its own
Statute or appropriate national law procedures in obtaining the presence
of an accused. 189 Whether the ICC will take the additional step of allowing improper transfer to vitiate personal jurisdiction-or delay it temporarily until the Court can properly obtain the presence of the accusedremains to be seen.
Whether a transfer of an accused to the ICC might be prevented by
immunity could properly come before the International Court of Justice,
rather than the ICC. If, for example, a State that was asked to transfer an
accused disagreed with another State on whether immunity in favor of the
second State exists, that dispute, if not resolved by direct negotiations or
ment on kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina); The King v. Walton, 11
O.L.R. 94 (Can. 1905) (noting that prisoner arrested in United States and taken to

Canada without extradition warrant), discussed in CHRISTOPHER PYLE, EXTRADITION,
POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 397 nn.26-27 (Temple Univ. Press 2001); see also
KNoops, supra note 175, at 243-45, 247-49 (describing ICTY's view of "luring" as
allowable for exercise of jurisdiction).
185. See, e.g., KNooPs, supra note 175, at 24143, 249-54 (discussing cases from
New Zealand, South Africa, United States, Zimbabwe and ICTY); see also PYLE, supra
note 184, Chs. 20, 21 & 406-07 n.51 (describing United States' use of abduction
and relevant law).
186. For further discussion of Prosecutor v. Milosevic, see supra notes 134-36
and accompanying text.
187. See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, at art. 9; S.C. Res. 827, supra note 181,
para. 4.
188. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 89(1). Under article 88 of the ICC Statute,
States Parties have the obligation to "ensure there are procedures under their national law" for all required forms of cooperation with the Court, such as transfer.
Id. art. 88.

189. For further discussion of the requirement that the ICC comply with its
own Statute regardless of acts of other organizations, such as the U.N., see gener-

ally Gallant, supra note 3. The requirement of following national law procedures is
derived from article 89(1) of the ICC Statute.
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through the good offices of the Assembly of States Parties, may be taken by
the disputing States to the International Court of Justice. 190
These immunities are not intended to produce impunity. However,
they may in fact prevent prosecutions in some cases.' 91 This is especially
likely if the person sought is a national of a non-Party State to the ICC
Statute (and which has not submitted to its jurisdiction), in a case that the
Security Council has not referred. In such a case, the non-Party State
would not have an obligation to surrender the person to the ICC, and the
prosecution could be thwarted.
3.

Security Council Deferral of Prosecution

A second, temporary, immunity arises when the Security Council requests the Court to defer an investigation or prosecution for a renewable
period of twelve months. 19 2 This provision was inserted to prevent an investigation or prosecution from interfering with negotiations to end an
19 3
ongoing or threatened war.
At the request of the United States, the Security Council used the
deferral power for the first time for a different purpose: in order to prevent peacekeepers in Bosnia from even possibly falling into the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Security Council also announced its intention to
1 94
renew the deferral year by year.
4.

Ne bis in idem

The final set of provisions granting immunity is at the heart of the
ICC complementarity scheme, and legitimately inures to the benefit of the
individual. A case is not admissible before the ICC if it is currently under
investigation or prosecution by a State with jurisdiction over it (unless the
State is unwilling or genuinely unable to investigate or prosecute); if it has
been investigated by a State with jurisdiction, and a decision not to prosecute was made (unless due to unwillingness or genuine inability of the
State to prosecute); or the person involved has already been tried (unless
190. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 119(2) (setting forth procedure for
resolving disputes over interpretation of ICC Statute). Of course, the case must
also be within the jurisdiction of the ICJ under its own Statute before the ICJ could
take the case. Cf Arrest Warrant, supra note 6 (discussing issue of prosecuting
immune person in national court).
191. See Otto Triffterer, Article 27, Irrelevance of Official Capacity, in OBSERVERS'
NOTES, supra note 145, at 501, 514; see also KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION

63-64

(2000).
192. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 16.
193. See, e.g., Morten Bergsmo &Jelena Pejic, Article 16, Deferral of Investigation
or Prosecution, in OBSERVERS' NOTES, supra note 145, at 373, 378.
194. See S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 176; Clark, supra note 176, at 8-10 (arguing
that this Resolution is invalid under both Chapter VII of U.N. Charter and ICC
Statute Article 16); Gallant, supra note 3 (revised version forthcoming) (arguing
that Resolution 1422 may be unwise, but is valid deferral request).
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the trial was conducted for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal liability or was otherwise not independent or impartial).' 95 National
law immunities based on official position cannot protect a person from
prosecution in the ICC if there exists a national unwillingness or inability
19 6
to prosecute.
The complementarity provisions concerning delay (and ultimate prevention) of ICC investigations and prosecutions represent a tilt back toward national powers from the scheme of the ad hoc tribunals. Those
tribunals had supremacy over national courts, and could require national
courts to defer their proceedings. 197 Because the rule of ne bis in idem as
stated in the ICTY and ICTR forbids national trial of an accused following
a tribunal trial,198 national courts lose jurisdiction over persons tried in
the ad hoc tribunals for purposes of the matters tried there.
The provisions of the ICC Statute on which the entity investigates and
prosecutes protect the interests of States in their own ability to investigate
and prosecute these crimes. However, they also protect the interests of
the individual in facing only one full and fair criminal investigation or
trial.
Three points need emphasis. First, protection against multiple prosecutions exists in many international human rights documents and the law
of many States. However, the ICC Statute's protection is broader than
most of those, which generally protect against multiple prosecutions in a
particular jurisdiction only, not multiple investigations, or investigations
and prosecutions in different jurisdictions.'19 9 The broadening of immunity from subsequent proceedings is seen as a progressive development in
international criminal procedure. Second, these provisions provide protection from prosecution both in the ICC, when there has been a national
investigation or prosecution, and in national systems, when there has been
an ICC prosecution (though not when there has been an ICC investigation without prosecution). 2° ° The protection against prosecution in the
195. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 17, 20.
196. Compare id. art. 27 (describing abolition of immunities), with id. arts. 17,
20 (discussing complementarity and ne bis in idem).
197. See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 9(2); ICTR Statute, supra note 75,
art. 8(2).
198. See ICTY Statute, supra note 94, art. 10(1) (spelling with hyphens between the words); ICTR Statute, supra note 75, art. 9(1) (spelling without hyphens). In article 20 of the ICC Statute, the phrase is ne bis in idem. See SAFFERLING,
supra note 2, at 326-29 (noting that ICTY Statute does not specifically prohibit
second proceeding in ICTY itself, but this should be inferred by references to
human rights principles).
199. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 14(7), 993 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V; SAFFERLING, supra note 2, at 324.
200. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 20. Note that only a trial carried to
conviction or acquittal in the ICC grants protection from prosecution in national
courts. An investigation not resulting in trial does not result in such protection.
See id. art. 20(2).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/2

46

Gallant: Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in Inter
2003]

JURISDICTION IN

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS

809

ICC where there has been a national investigation and a decision not to
2"
prosecute appears in the article on admissibility of cases in the court, 0
not in the article on ne bis in idem. Nonetheless, the provision serves the
same human rights interest. Finally, these provisions generally do provide
for permanent immunity from further prosecution (except that the protection against ICC investigation and prosecution during a national investigation or prosecution may not be permanent if the national proceeding
turns out not to have been genuine).
Those who expect problems of immunity and impunity to disappear
as a result of the ICC Statute will probably be disappointed. Rights of
third countries to prevent the Court from obtaining the presence of accused persons will probably cause frustration. One can also expect disputes to arise regarding whether a national decision not to prosecute a
case following investigation was because of inability or unwillingness to
prosecute. The extent to which these problems inhibit the abolition of
immunity and impunity in practice remains to be seen.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION WHERE A SITUATION IS REFERRED BY A STATE

V.

OR AN INVESTIGATION IS INITIATED BY THE PROSECUTOR

PROPRIO MOTU

A.

The General Rule

The ICC Statute contains a specific provision concerning jurisdiction
in situations that have been referred to the Court by a State or where an
investigation is begun by the Prosecutor proprio motu (on his or her own
motion). Personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction over states are intertwined
in this provision, and require some teasing out. This provision is highly
technical, and contains at least one important ambiguity on its face (concerning so-called "effects" jurisdiction). It is far more technical and limiting than the provisions concerning jurisdiction where a case is referred to
202
the Prosecutor by the U.N. Security Council.
In the case of the referral of a situation by a State Party to the Prosecutor, or the case of an investigation initiated by the Prosecutor proprio
motu,

...the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the
following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court...:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or
aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a
203
national.
201. See id. art. 17(1).

202. See id. art. 13(b).
203. See id. art. 12(2).
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This provision is located in Part 2 (Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law) of the Statute and, unlike the age limitation above, is not expressly stated as a matter of personal jurisdiction.
Part 2 of the ICC Statute mediates the discussion of personal jurisdiction by reference to jurisdiction over states rather than individuals. A state
that becomes a party to the Statute "accepts the jurisdiction of the Court
with respect to the crimes mentioned in article 5."2o4 A non-Party State
may "by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise ofjurisdiction of the Court .... ,,205 However, Part 2's avoidance of a term such
as 'jurisdiction over the person" or 'jurisdiction to adjudicate" cannot be
used to evade the fact that the Court, an international organization, will
have jurisdiction over prescribed classes of persons.
Where a situation has been referred to the Court by a State or by the
Prosecutor proprio motu, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate over those individuals not covered in the quoted passage: i.e., nationals of a State that has not accepted the Court's jurisdiction and who have
not committed an allegedly criminal act on the territory of such a State.
The Court needs jurisdiction (legitimate authority) over the accused as
well as the subject matter of the crime. The statement that in certain cases
the Court will "exercise its jurisdiction" only if States bearing certain relationships to the persons suspected have accepted the jurisdiction of the
Court 20

6

is a roundabout way of defining by limitation the persons over

which the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations of crime.
Outside of this language, there is nothing in the ICC Statute that defines
the persons who may be prosecuted on the basis of referrals by a State or
through investigations begun by the Prosecutor propfio motu.
There is no claim of universal jurisdiction over the person in these
cases. Indeed, there is not even a claim of so-called "passive personality
jurisdiction,"jurisdiction where a victim of a crime within the subject mat20 7
ter jurisdiction of the ICC is a national of a State Party.
In a case involving nationals of a State that has accepted jurisdiction
of the Court, jurisdiction to adjudicate is clear: the Court has jurisdiction
over nationals of these States to adjudicate allegations that they have committed crimes specified in the Statute. In a case where the conduct occurred on the territory of a State that has accepted the Court's
jurisdiction, the notion of personal jurisdiction is only a bit less clear: the
Court has jurisdiction over persons who acted in the territory of these
States to adjudicate allegations that these acts amounted to crimes specified in the Statute.
204. See id. art. 12(1).
205. See id. art. 12(3); see also id. art. 12(2).

206. See id. art. 12(2).
207. See KrTICHAISAREE, supra note 8, at 327-88 (commenting on ICC Statute,

art. 12(2)).
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Some have objected to the provision that nationals of a non-Party
State to the ICC Statute could be prosecuted under the Statute for crimes
committed on the territory of a State Party. For example, an American
soldier operating on the territory of a State Party during a U.N.
peacekeeping mission could be charged with crimes before the Court,
even if the United States is not a party to the ICC Statute. Territorial jurisdiction, however, is one of the most basic concepts of criminal law. International law allows a State, by treaty (in this case, the ICC Statute), to
agree that an international tribunal has personal jurisdiction over individuals with whom it might have personal jurisdiction under the territorial
20 8
principle.
The ICC Statute does, however, provide ways for non-Party States to
protect many of their nationals, such as diplomats and soldiers, from the
exercise of ICCjurisdiction. 20 9 These devices including diplomatic immunity, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and their analogues, are, like
territorial jurisdiction itself, deeply embedded in the international law tradition, and the ICC Statute does not purport to do away with them. As
mentioned above, the Security Council has already announced an intention to defer prosecution of peacekeepers. 210 Thus, the controversy over
this problem, as a legal matter, may be much less than meets the current
political eye.

208. Cf Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 38 (noting that State may give authority to conduct prosecution to Nuremberg Tribunal); Randall, supra note 12, at
820-21 (explaining treaty may legitimately grant all States adhering to itjurisdiction to adjudicate allegations of international crime occurring in any of them).
For a subtle argument against Court jurisdiction over nationals of a non-Party
State, on the grounds that delegation of jurisdiction by a State Party may impair
the interests of the non-Party State, see Morris, supra note 17. Contra Michael P.
Scharf, The ICC'sJurisdictionover the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S.
Position, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 67 (2001). Morris's argument is not without
force, in that it identifies political reasons a non-Party State may want to object to a
State Party's ceding ofjurisdiction to an international organization. This does not,
however, demonstrate the illegality of the grant. Moriss's argument that the delegation to the ICC is illegal because the traditional grounds for jurisdiction do not
encompass the grant, overstates matters, because the traditional heads ofjurisdiction, at the time they were conceptualized, only purported to address national
courts'jurisdiction. See Morris, supra note 17, at 47-52. Thus, there is still reason
to apply the rule of SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) (Aug. 10, 1927),
that a challenge to jurisdiction fails if no ground is shown why jurisdiction is illegal. It is significant that the non-Party State and its national have access to information about the State Party's participation in the ICC, and that the ICC Statute
protects the international human rights of those brought before the Court. In
sum, those States that believe prosecution of international crime is important may
protect theirjurisdiction from outside political pressure not to exercise it by giving
it to the ICC.
209. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 98. For examples of the use of some of
these devices, see supra note 183 and accompanying text.
210. See S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 176.
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Two Theoretical Problems

There will be interpretation and application issues regarding the provision on jurisdiction following referral by a State or initiation of investigation by the Prosecutor. Two of them which have interesting ramifications
for general criminal law and for the international legal personality of individuals are addressed here.
1. Jurisdictionover the Participantfrom a Non-Party State Who Acts in a NonParty State with Effect in a State Party
Based on the text of the ICC Statute, it could be argued either way
whether the Court would have jurisdiction to adjudicate over a person
who aided, abetted or otherwise assisted 2 ' I persons who acted on the territory of an accepting State, but never himself nor herself acted there. In an
era of easy communications and widespread trade in illegal weapons, this
situation is likely to occur. For example, an outsider might supply poison
gas knowing or intending it be used on civilians in the territory of a State
Party. 2 12 One could also argue either way whether the Court would have
jurisdiction to adjudicate over a person acting outside the territory of a
State Party firing prohibited weapons, such as that same poison gas, into
the territory of a State Party at civilians.
The argument exists in the context of fairly traditional law of personal
jurisdiction and of treaty interpretation. It is an argument about the interpretation of a treaty, the ICC Statute, rather than the appropriate limita213
tions of customary or other international law. The case of the S.S. Lotus
is an example of a national court-in Turkey-having criminal jurisdiction over a person who did not act within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, but whose acts (in that case negligent rather than intentional) had
adverse effects on board a Turkish flag ship-the drowning of eight sailors
and loss of the ship.2 14 This does not establish, however, that the ICC
Statute in fact claims this jurisdiction for the Court.
211. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3) (c).
212. See id. art. 25(3) (aiding, abetting, soliciting and other contributions toward crimes within jurisdiction of Court prohibited); see also id. art. 8(2)(b)(xviii)
(prohibiting use of poisonous gases).
213. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) 10 (Aug. 1927) (deciding no rule of international law prohibits State from exercising personal jurisdiction over extraterritorial actor whose act had effects on State's territory); see also
Handelswerkerij G.J. Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735, 19
C.M.L.R. 284 (1977) (noting civil lawsuit for river pollution may be brought in
Netherlands even though pollution occurred upstream in France as result of acts
by French corporation). The specific rule of the Lotus case concerning jturisdiction
over persons involved in shipping accidents was changed by multilateral treaties.
See, e.g., U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 97, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Convention on the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, art. 11, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
214. Accord MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNArIONAL LAw 459 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing Lockerbie case in which Scotland attempted to and eventually took jurisdiction over two Libyan nationals accused of planting bomb on civilian airliner that
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On the one hand, against jurisdiction over our hypothetical chemical
arms supplier or user, it could be argued that the ICC Statute contains no
clear provision granting territorial "effects" jurisdiction. An international
court should not gain jurisdiction over a person acting outside a consenting State without a clear indication, absent from the ICC Statute, of an
intent to claim such jurisdiction. The "conduct in question" of the outside
arms merchant or user did not occur in the territory of a State accepting
jurisdiction, and thus the ICC Statute excludes jurisdiction. 21 5 The purposes and objects of the Statute include continuing recognition of the
concept of State sovereignty insofar as possible, and extension of jurisdiction to acts committed outside the territory of a State Party could be seen
216
as infringing on the sovereignty of a non-Party State.
Arguing in favor ofjurisdiction to adjudicate, the conduct that constituted the substantive crime, in this case the use of banned weapons on
civilians, occurred on the territory of a State that has accepted jurisdiction
of the Court. Moreover, sending weapons into a State that has accepted
exploded over Scotland). The site of explosion was the only connection that the
defendants or crime had with Scotland. See id. A number of examples, both criminal and civil, from both common and civil law countries, of "effects" jurisdiction
are collected in JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 103-06 (3d ed. 1988). These include:
France-Beausir (Ct. of Cassation 1977), discussed in 82 REVUE GENERAL DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIQUE

1171 (observing that French court has ju-

risdiction over Belgian national polluting river water in Belgium because
river flowed into France);
Germany--Cartel Law, sec. 98(2), translated and reprinted in 1 GUIDE
TO RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, GERMANY 1.0, 1, 42 (OECD 1964)
(applying law to restraints on competition having effect in Germany
"even if they result from acts done outside such area");
India-Mobarik Ali Ahmed v. Bombay (S.Ct. 1957), reprinted in 24
I.L.R. 156 (1961) (discussing how Pakistan national acting from Pakistan
was tried for cheating person in India);
United States-Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967) (providing that four Canadian nationals acting in Canada and Mexico were extradited to and tried in the United
States for conspiracy to smuggle heroin into United States). See generally
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
Two of the cases cited by SWEENEY ET AL., are not analogous to the problem in
the ICC Statute discussed here. These are:
Kenya-Missisi v. Republic (High Ct. 1969), reprinted in 48 I.L.R. 90
(involving person acting in Uganda accused of trying to defraud government of Kenya; not strictly analogous because person was Kenyan national and ICC Statute explicitly provides for jurisdiction over all
nationals of States parties, wherever they act, which is principle of socalled "active nationality" jurisdiction);
United Kingdom-The Queen v. Baxter, I Q.B. 1, 8 (Eng. C.A. 1972)
(involving person in Northern Ireland accused of attempting to defraud
gamblers in England; not strictly analogous because occurring entirely
within United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).
215. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12.
216. See id. preamble (discussing complementarity of ICC to national
jurisdictions).
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the Court's jurisdiction is conduct that is not complete until the weapons
reach that State. Thus, it is fair to say that our arms merchant comes
within the Court's personal jurisdiction by assisting action in such a state.
Our arms user has directly caused the prohibited effect in a State Party. It
is fair to charge someone for intentionally or knowingly acting in a way
217
that has a prohibited effect on the territory of another State.
The "effects" doctrine is sufficiently well established 218 that, in the
case of aiding, abetting, ordering, soliciting, inducing or intentionally con2 19
tributing to a crime within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court,
the ICC Statute should be read to permit the Court to exercise jurisdiction
over persons supporting crime within the territory of an accepting State,
even if they are not within such territory when they act. 220 This is an application of the use of the principles and rules of international law and general principles of law existing in national laws as a way to liquidate an
ambiguity in the ICC Statute. The use of both these sources is authorized
in both the ICC Statute itself and the general law of treaties. 22 1 The most
important purpose of the ICC Statute, the deterrence and punishment of
217. Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
§ 421(2)0) cmt. b (1987) (explaining that State may exercise jurisdiction
to adjudicate over person who has carried on "an activity having a substantial, diSTATES

rect and foreseeable effect within the state, but only in respect of such activity" in
outside State; applies in principle to criminal as well as most civil matters). See
generally Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984 (Ga. 1893) (holding that Georgia court may
try defendant for firing bullet from South Carolina at person in Georgia). These
precedents do not control the hypothesized case because our case requires interpretation of the ICC Statute, not a decision based upon the possible limits of jurisdiction under general international law.
218. See Edwin D. Dickinson et al., HarvardResearch in InternationalLaw, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 Am.J. INT'L L. 435, 487-94 (Supp. 1935); see also
Akehurst, supra note 12, at 153-55 (criticizing extreme applications of doctrine);
Ellen S. Podgor, ExtraterritorialCriminalJurisdiction:Replacing "Objective Territoriality"
with "Defensive Territoriality",28 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 117, 123-25 (2003) (same,
especially critical of unconstrained growth of jurisdiction over economic crime).
219. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3) (explaining that these are principal means of incurring responsibility for crime other than direct commission).
Also included therein is direct and public incitement to genocide, which the author believes is substantively somewhat more problematic than the other means of
incurring responsibility for crime, because of the possibility of conflicts with guarantees of free expression in international and national law. See id. So long as there
are no such conflicts, the jurisdictional arguments concerning direct and public
incitement to genocide under article 21(3) of the ICC Statute are the same as for
the other means of incurring individual criminal liability. See id. art. 21(3).
220. SeeJANIS, supra note 16, at 328 (quoting from RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

402(1) (c)); see also HANS

KELSEN,

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 309 (Robert W. Tucker, ed. 2d ed. 1967) (discussing State's ability to punish citizens of another State for crimes committed
within its borders); cf Dickinson et al., supra note 218, at 503-06.
221. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art 21(b) ("principles and rules of international law"); see also id. art. 21 (c) ("Failing that, general principles of law derived by
the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world, including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and
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the most serious crimes against the international community, suggests that
aiders and abettors of such crimes acting in non-consenting States be held
to be within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Additionally, jurisdiction is described in article 13 concerning a "situation 2 2 2 or a "crime,"223 either of
which may include, in ordinary language, acts both within and without the
accepting jurisdiction; the Statute does not speak in terms of investigating
only specific "acts." Thus, it is proper to extend personal jurisdiction to all
those contributing to the commission of a crime in a State that has accepted the Court's jurisdiction. Further, the Statute does not distinguish
between the person who, for example, directly fires a prohibited weapon
at a civilian target, and the person who aids and abets such an attack by
sending the weapons into ajurisdiction for use; the sender is justly subject
to jurisdiction.
The author finds the arguments in favor of territorial "effects" jurisdiction persuasive, in both the direct action and the aiding and abetting
cases. However, limits of this jurisdiction need careful definition. For example, it would be quite reasonable to extend "effects"jurisdiction only to
those who knew or intended that their acts would have effect in a State
that has accepted the Court's jurisdiction.
This issue of "effects" jurisdiction will probably not be resolved until
raised by a case before the Court or by an amendment to the ICC. Statute.
There is not a Rule of Procedure and Evidence nor an Element of Crimes
22 4
covering this issue.
Note that, for academic purposes, one could argue that using the language of personal jurisdiction (or jurisdiction to adjudicate)-as in the
paragraphsjust above-is unnecessary and potentially misleading in a case
where a person is neither a national of a State that has accepted the
Court's jurisdiction, nor has committed an act while physically within the
jurisdiction of such a State. That is, the Statute does not set up this issue
in explicit terms of personal jurisdiction. One could treat this as an issue
of subject matter jurisdiction, and the arguments and results would be the
same.
There are, however, some good reasons for treating this as a matter of
personal jurisdiction. First, the language of the ICC Statute regarding exercise of jurisdiction speaks of the Court having jurisdiction over "situations" referred to it by a State Party to the Statute. 225 One can imagine the
Court having subject matter jurisdiction over a general situation, but not
with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards"); cf
VCOLT, supra note 45, arts. 34, 35, 38.
222. See ICC Statute, supranote 1, arts. 13(a), 14 (discussing referrals by party
State).
223. See id. art. 13(c) (detailing investigations initiated by Prosecutor).
224. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in ICC-ASP/l/3, supra note 85; see
also Elements of Crimes, in ICC-ASP/1/3, supra note 85 (lacking definition of elements for S.S. Lotus-type situation).
225. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 13(a), 14.
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over an individual who does not meet certain jurisdictional requirements.

Suppose, for example, a State Party refers to the Prosecutor a situation
where genocide has been committed in neighboring States pursuant to a
common scheme or plan, but only one State has ratified the ICC Statute.
Under the Statute, the Court would have jurisdiction over a national of the
ratifying State who is accused of committing genocide in either State, or a
national of the non-ratifying State who is accused of committing genocide
in the ratifying State. There is, however, no jurisdiction to adjudicate over
a national of the non-ratifying State accused solely of committing genocide
in the non-ratifying State. In this analysis, the concept of personal jurisdiction fits more comfortably than that of subject matter jurisdiction.
Second, there is no more textual support for treating this as subject
matter jurisdiction rather than as personal jurisdiction. In the cases of
State Party referrals, or Prosecutor-initiated investigations, the Court "may
exercise its jurisdiction if [certain] States are Parties to this Statute .... 226 This language does not require the use of one rubric rather
than the other.
Additionally, the ICC Statute is properly concerned with the principle
of legality of prosecution of individuals. "A person shall not be criminally
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes,
''2 27
at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
As pointed out above, the further provision of the ICC Statute, that "[n]o
person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior
to [its] entry into force ... ,,221 has been described by one respected commentator as a matter of 'jurisdiction rationepersonae."22 ' This focus on the
justice of exercising power over an individual also suggests the applicability of the concept of personal jurisdiction in the above situation. That is,
the question is whether it is fair for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over
a person who is not a national of a State Party and has not committed an
act on the territory of a State Party. This is a question traditionally ana2 31
lyzed under the rubric of personal jurisdiction.
Within issues of personal jurisdiction, the question of "effects" jurisdiction is frequently considered by scholars under the rubric of jurisdiction to prescribe-i.e., authority to make applicable rules of law. 23 ' Most

of the cases concerning jurisdiction to prescribe on the basis of effects
226. Id. art. 12(2).
227. Id. art. 22(1).
228. Id. art. 24(1).
229. See Williams, supra note 163, at 323, 327 (asserting that Article 11 is
linked substantively to Article 24, which deals with jurisdiction ratione personae).
230. For further discussion of the referral of a situation by the Security Council under article 13(b) of the ICC Statute, see infra Part VI. In such a situation,
there may be jurisdiction over persons who are neither citizens of States parties
nor acted there, at least where one of the relevant States is a U.N. Member.
231. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1051-55 (West Pub.

Co. 3d ed. 1993);

SWEENEY ET AL.,

supra note 214, at 90-108. For a further discus-

sion ofjurisdiction to prescribe, see supra Part 11.
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within the prescribing jurisdiction involve an adjudicating court making a
determination that it is part of an entity (usually a national body) with
jurisdiction to prescribe. 23 2 International law generally permits States to
make law concerning activity outside their borders that has direct effects
233
within their borders.
In the case of the ICC, the law being prescribed is, for the most part,
customary international criminal law already. 23 4 The community of States
adopting the ICC Statute possesses the jurisdiction to prescribe penal law
against these acts through the treaty process. 235 To the extent that the
issue arises in the ICC, it will likely be in the context of whether a specific
accused can properly be brought before the Court on the basis of acts
committed outside the territory of State parties-an issue best characterized as jurisdiction to adjudicate. Given that the arguments do not vary
depending on the name given the issue, it may not matter much whether
this issue is called a matter of jurisdiction to prescribe or to adjudicate.
2.

Retroactively-effective Declarationsof Non-Party States AcceptingJurisdiction
of the Court and a Nulla Crimen Problem

The ICC Statute also limits jurisdiction by the time of commission of
the crime. One of the provisions concerned with referrals by a State Party
or Prosecutor-initiated investigations creates a problem of legality. The
Court may exercise its jurisdiction only as to "crimes committed after the
entry into force" of the Statute, or in the case of a State becoming a party
to the Statute after its entry into force, only as to "crimes committed after
the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless the State has made
a declaration [accepting its jurisdiction for referrals by a State Party or
investigations by the Prosecutor proprio motu]. "236
This section creates a problem of nulla crimen sine lege if a crime under
the ICC Statute is not also a crime under customary international law, and
the way the Court has jurisdiction over the case and the accused is by a
declaration of a non-Party State accepting the jurisdiction of the Court
under article 12(3). If the acts were committed before the declaration,
then at the time and place of the commission of the conduct in question,
232. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 431 cmt. a (1987) ("[U]nder international law, a state may not exercise
authority to enforce law that it had no jurisdiction to prescribe."). In this context,
adjudication is a portion of the enforcement process.
233. For further discussion of exterritorial jurisdiction, see supra notes 203-10
and accompanying text.
234. But see SADAT, supra note 10, at 12 (arguing that ICC Statute "required
clarifying and elucidating the precise content of [international criminal offenses]
in a way that often moved the 'law' of the Statute far beyond existing customary
international law understandings.").
235. For further discussion of the jurisdiction to prescribe penal law against
acts occurring within the State's border through the treaty process, see supra Part
II(D).
236. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 11 (referring to art. 12(3)).
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the accuseds' acts were not criminal, and there is no criminal responsibility. This result is reached by proper application of the nulla crimen article,
excluding a person's criminal responsibility where an act is not "at the
237
time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court."
This is not an imaginary problem. As discussed above, it is not self
evident that all crimes defined under the ICC Statute are currently customary international crimes-recruitment or enlistment of child soldiers
under fifteen years of age, and some environmental crimes-may be
counterexamples. 238 This is neither surprising nor a negative reflection
on the drafters, many of whom sought a progressive development of inter239
national criminal law and procedure.
Although it is not clear how the Court might rule on a claim that a
crime, such as enlistment of child soldiers, is not customary, it is clear that
it would need to enter into an analysis of the issue. The nulla crimen rule is
part of the ICC Statute itself, as is an acceptance of international human
rights generally. 24°1 Thus, the Court could not simply rely on the fact that
24 1
the Statute asserts that this is a customary international crime.
As discussed above, two highly respected commentators argue that
the ICC Statute "is clearly intended to have the status of custom and even
of jus cogens obligations." 242 It is certainly true that many of those in the
movement to create an International Criminal Court hope that this will be
the effect of the ICC Statute. 24 3 Jurisdiction to prescribe international
criminal law does reside in the international community, and such prescription can include development of jus cogens or customary law that
would bind all. Additionally, inclusion in the ICC Statute may be used as
evidence that any given crime has become customary, in the same way that
inclusion of other rules of law in treaties may be used as evidence of
24 4
custom.
237. See id. art 22(1). For further discussion of immunities from jurisdiction,
see infra Part IV(B).
238. For further discussion of customary international crimes, see supra notes
94-99 and accompanying text; see also SADAT, supra note 10, at 12.
239. See SADAr, supra note 10, at 12-14.
240. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 21(3), 22.
241. See id. art. 8(2) (b), (e) (providing statements that recruitment or enlistment of child soldiers is "serious violation[ ] of the laws and customs of [armed
conflict, either international or non-international]" for which there is individual
criminal liability). By contrast, the Nuremberg Tribunal at least asserted that it was
bound by the verbal formulation of crimes contained in its Charter, though it did
enter into a nulla crimen analysis anyway. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 38,
at 219-23, 238-39, 253.
242. See Sadat & Carden, supra note 10, at 409-10 n.167.
243. The author shares this hope but, as discussed below, does not believe
this hope is equivalent to the immediate transformation of all crimes listed in the
ICC Statute into customary international criminal law.
244. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3, 41 (Feb. 20); see also HENKIN, supra note 231, at 101-02.
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However, the group of States adopting the ICC Statute was about seventy at the time of the creation of the Court, and excluded China, India,
the United States, Indonesia and Russia, as well as others among the
world's most populous and powerful States. The substantial, but minority,
group of State parties to the ICC Statute cannot immediately change customary international criminal law by defining new crimes for all individuals whose States might, at some time in the future, declare acceptance of
245
the Court's jurisdiction.
The nulla crimen rule defines a substantive right of individuals under
the treaty (i.e., the ICC Statute), as well as under customary international
law. If there has not yet been proscription of these new crimes with regard
to certain persons with no connection to State parties to the ICC Statute
(because the State parties have no jurisdiction to prescribe new crimes for
them), there should be no jurisdiction to adjudicate over such individuals,
when they are accused of committing acts that constitute the new
246
crimes.
If the relevant State has become a party to the ICC Statute or accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC before the date of the acts alleged to be
criminal, there is no nulla crimen problem, because the acts are criminal as
to the accused individuals when committed. 24 7 Note, however, that in this
case, an apparently procedural statement by a State-that it accepts the
245. See, e.g., VCOLT, supra note 45, art. 34.
246. See Madeline H. Morris, UniversalJurisdictionin a Divided World: Conference

Remarks, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 337, 347-49 (2001). Professor Morris argues that a
treaty (such as the 1970s and 1980s treaties on terrorism) cannot, in and of itself,
create universal jurisdiction where none existed before. See id. Her claim is that
such a treaty would affect the rights of non-Party States in a way not authorized by
international law. See id. By contrast, the argument here is that universal jurisdiction does not exist where a crime is not recognized at least in customary international law, because such jurisdiction would violate the human rights of the person
from a non-treaty state subject to it. But see Michael P. Scharf, Application of TreatyBased UniversalJurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 363,

375-76 (2001) (arguing that treaties discussed by Professor Morris concern acts
about which "the perpetrator cannot seriously argue" their criminality so that nulla
crimen principle is inapplicable). Scharf's statement could be interpreted to mean
that universal jurisdiction could be invoked where acts are condemned by all states
(possibly by analogy to "general principles of law") without an inquiry into whether
the act is forbidden by "customary international" law. See id. at 379-80 (discussing
U.S. claim of universal jurisdiction over two "stateless" vessels in international waters which were transporting marijuana in United States v. Marino-Garcia,679 F.2d
1373 (11th Cir. 1982)). However, it could also be interpreted to mean that the
perpetrator cannot seriously argue that the crimes set out in these particular treaties are not forbidden by customary international law. By contrast, the argument
of this Article is that there are crimes in the ICC Statute that might not in fact be
crimes for all persons in all States. Scharf also denies Professor Morris's view that
rights of non-treaty States are invaded by prosecution on the basis of universal
jurisdiction, at least for the crimes under the terrorism treaties. See id. at 377-78.
247. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, (ICTY, Trial Ch., Nov. 8,
2001) (concerning allegations of crimes committed five years after creation of
ICTY inKosovo in1999).
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jurisdiction of the ICC-in fact defines substantive international criminal
law for certain persons, its nationals and others within its jurisdiction.
The distinction between a rule created by customary international law
and a rule created by treaty law normally does not bear the weight that it is
being asked to bear here. Normally, the distinction applies to whether a
State that has not adopted a treaty or other international agreement can
be held to a rule of law that is set out in the treaty. It can be held to the
standard only if the rule is also a rule of customary international law. In
that case, it is not the treaty, but the customary law, which binds the State.
The weight that this distinction is being asked to bear here is that of determining whether an individual may be prosecuted for a particular crime set
out in the ICC Statute. An individual from a State accepting the jurisdiction of the Court who allegedly committed a crime before the State in
question accepted the Court's jurisdiction can be prosecuted only if the
crime was both customary at the time of its alleged commission, and Statutory-i.e., within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court.
The alternative to making these judgments is unattractive: it would be
to say that the acceptance of jurisdiction of the Court by a non-Party State
to the ICC Statute can only apply to crimes committed after acceptancei.e., prospectively. This essentially would make acceptance of jurisdiction
the equivalent of ratification, which it is not. Rather, acceptance allows a
State that is unable to prosecute cases of heinous atrocities, or that believes it is in the interest of national reconciliation to remove its own
courts from the process of investigation and trial, to give those cases to the
ICC, rather than to let them go unpunished.
VI.

JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE AND JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE IN

SITUATIONS REFERRED TO THE COURT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH
SPECIAL ATTENTION TO SITUATIONS INVOLVING STATES NOT PARTIES TO
THE ICC STATUTE

The ICC Statute is far more ambitious concerning personal jurisdiction in cases that have been referred to the Court by the U.N. Security
Council. On its face, the Court's personal jurisdiction extends to all natural persons over the age of eighteen at the time of the commission of a
crime. 248 In these situations, there is no language analogous to the article
12 limits regarding who may be brought before the Court. 249 Personal
jurisdiction is not limited here by actual ratification or acceptance of the
2 1
Statute by a State. 0
This suggests that, for Security Council referrals, the ICC Statute
adopts, for an international organization, a theory of universal jurisdiction
to adjudicate over persons accused of international crime.25 1 As this Part
248.
249.
250.
251.

See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 25(1), 26.
Compare id. art. 12, with id. art. 13.
Cf id. art. 12.
See, e.g., Sadat & Carden, supra note 10.
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will illustrate, whether the Court has jurisdiction over an individual on a
theory of universal jurisdiction may depend on the type of crime allegedwhether jus cogens, customary or non-customary.
A.

Person (EitherAccused or Victim) or Crime Connected to Party State to the
ICC Statute

Where the person or crime involved has some relevant connection to
a State Party to the ICC Statute, there is no problem of personal jurisdiction. That State has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court over all crimes
within the Court's jurisdiction. 252 Nothing suggests limitation of personal
jurisdiction in such a case, whether an accused is a national of the State
Party, acted on the territory of the State Party or aided and abetted crimes
that were committed in the territory of a State Party. 2 "3- There is no statutory language that arguably prohibits "effects" jurisdiction following a Security Council referral, and international law generally permits the
254
exercise of criminal jurisdiction on this basis.
Where a situation is referred by the Security Council, the Prosecutor
may also ask the Court to recognize so-called "passive personality jurisdiction." Under this theory of jurisdiction, a tribunal asserts that the appropriate legislative power (usually the legislative authority of its State) has
jurisdiction to prescribe. The tribunal then has jurisdiction to adjudicate
a case, because of the nationality of the victim, not the nationality of the
perpetrator or the place of the ill effect. 25 5 Such a situation could arise in
the case of an attack on civilian refugees who are nationals of a State Party
to the ICC Statute fleeing through international waters, if neither the attackers nor the vessels were connected to a State Party. It could also arise
through an attack on a refugee camp where the refugees are from a State
Party but the attackers are not.
While this kind of jurisdiction is not utilized by all States in their national courts, and has been heavily criticized, it is sufficiently well accepted
that one can say the exercise of such jurisdiction by States is permitted by
international law, at least where national security or other special interests
in protecting potential victims that are nationals of the State exercising
252. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
253. The restriction on this type ofjurisdiction does not exist in the text concerning Security Council referrals, as it arguably does in the cases of State referrals
or investigations initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu. See supraPart V(B)(1); cf
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No. 10 (1927) (holding that customary international law permitted Turkey to try citizen of France for acts committed on French ship that caused collision with Turkish ship). Compare ICC Statute,
supra note 1, art. 12, with id. art. 13.
254. For further discussion of "effects" jurisdiction, see supra Part V(B) (1).
255. The ICC Statute does not authorize passive personality jurisdiction
where situations are referred by States parties or investigated by the Prosecutor
proprio motu. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12; see also KITTICHAISAREE, supra
note 8, at 327-28 (discussing strengths and shortcomings of ICC). For further discussion, see supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction are concerned. 256 Recent language from the ICJ indicates
that passive personality jurisdiction might be a more solid basis for national criminal jurisdiction than true universal jurisdiction, though the ICJ

did not actually decide this issue. President Guillaume, in his separate
opinion, stated, "Under the law as classically formulated, a State normally
has jurisdiction over an offense committed abroad only if the offender, or
at very least the victim, has the nationality of that State or if the crime
257
threatens its internal or external security."
The interests of the international community (as well as the individual interests of any State Party to the ICC Statute) in preventing genocide,
war crimes and crimes against humanity are similar special interests, which
would justify an international criminal tribunal in accepting passive personality jurisdiction. In the course of an international conflict, nationals
of a State that is not a party to the ICC Statute may commit crimes within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court against nationals of a State
Party. If an accused allegedly committed an act against nationals of a State

Party on the territory of a non-Party State (as by taking them hostage, or
256. See, e.g.,

CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYS-

TEM 166 (5th ed. 2001) (citing French Code de Prochdure Phnale, art. 689(1));
BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 306 (criticizing doctrine and stating that many cases

involving it would fall under protective or universal principles of jurisdiction);
supra note 16, at 330 n.337 (citing French Code Civile, art. 14); KELSEN, supra
note 220, at 309; 3 HERSCH- LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 235 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1977) (relying
on I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 147 (6th ed. 1937)); RUBIN, supra note 25,
at 86-87 nn.63, 67 (indicating early support for doctrine, diminishing by 20th century) (relying on 1 CHARLES MOLLOY, DE JURE MARITIMO, ch. IV, para. viii, at 37
(1677)); SiHAw, supra note 214, at 467-68 (asserting passive personality principle is
not strong ground for jurisdiction); see alsoJ.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO IN-

JANIS,

TERNATIONAL LAW 275 (7th ed. 1972) (referring to statutes in Mexico, Brazil and

Italy).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402 cmt g mentions passive personality jurisdiction and some recent United
States statutes and cases have appeared to use it as a basis for criminal jurisdiction
in terrorism and drug cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2002), applied in United States v.
Ymis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (allowing U.S. to exercise jurisdiction over
foreign national); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984) (shooting of U.S. drug agents in Colombia); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332 et seq. (2002),
applied in United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (allowing
prosecution of foreign defendant). Traditionally the United States opposed the
doctrine. See generallyJoshua Robinson, United States PracticePenalizingInternational
TerroristsNeedlessly Undercuts Its Opposition to the Passive PersonalityPrinciple, 16 B. U.
INT'L L.J. 487 (1998) (stggesting U.S. Department ofJustice institute policy of only
prosecuting those cases that have basis for jurisdiction in existing international law
to prevent reciprocal exercise of passive personality principle by other nations).
257. SeeArrest Warrant, supra note 6, paras. 15-17, 4142; id. para. 4 (Separate
Opinion of President Guillaume); id. paras. 44-47 (Joint Separate Opinion of
Judges Higgins, Kooimans and Buergenthal) (concluding that universal jurisdiction, even in absentia, is not prohibited in limited circumstances); id. para. 5 (Opinion Individuelle de M. Rezek); id. para. 44ff (Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Van den
Wyngaert) (accepting both passive personality and universal jurisdiction). But see
id. (Separate Opinion ofJudge Koroma) (emphasizing that issue of universal jurisdiction was not decided).
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killing them as part of a plan of genocide), passive personality jurisdiction
would justify the Court in taking the case.

The language of the ICC Statute concerning Security Council referrals is consistent with the exercise of passive personality jurisdiction. This
provision contains no limitations on the jurisdiction of the Court, based
2 58
on either the place of the crime or the nationality of the offender.
Adopting the theory of passive personality jurisdiction would allow the
Court in this type of case to avoid the issues of true universal jurisdiction
2 59
discussed below.
As with "effects" jurisdiction above, passive personality jurisdiction is
often considered under the rubric of jurisdiction to prescribe.2 60 The argument for considering this as a matter ofjurisdiction to adjudicate in the
context of an international criminal tribunal is similar to that of "effects"
jurisdiction. 26' In the context of international criminal tribunals, this issue has more to do with the propriety of exercising personal jurisdiction
over an accused person-jurisdiction to adjudicate-than it does with the
prescribing authorities that such a tribunal may legitimately use. Again,
however, the characterization as one or the other may not matter too
much.
B.

Persons with No Relevant Connection to a State Party to the ICC StatuteIs Jurisdiction Universal After a Security Council Referral?
The Security Council has jurisdiction over disputes that threaten the

peace among all U.N. Members. The U.N. Charter also appears to claim
authority for the Security Council over disputes that threaten the peace
where one or more parties are non-Members. 262 It is possible that the
Court will be asked, through a Security Council referral to recognize some
258. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 13(b). By contrast, the language concerning non-Security Council referral cases does not permit jurisdiction based
solely on the nationality of the victim. See id. art. 12(2).
259. One special case is worth mentioning. Switzerland and Nauru were both
non-Members of the U.N. when they signed the ICC Statute (though Nauru is now
a Member and Switzerland has approved a referendum on becoming a Member).
If a State ratifies the ICC Statute but does not become a UN member, there is no
problem in international law or justice if the Court exercises jurisdiction over persons connected with them following U.N. Security Council referral of a situation.
The States will have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court over all crimes named
in the Statute, regardless of the source of the referral of allegations to the Court.
The States will have given consent to the legal effect of U.N. Security Council actions. Thus, the case would not fall within the rule that a treaty (i.e., the U.N.
Charter) does not apply to a non-Party without its consent. See VCOLT, supra note
45, art. 34.
260. For further discussion of jurisdiction to prescribe as a rubric for discussion, see supra notes 15, 204-05 and accompanying text.
261. For further discussion of"effects"jurisdiction, see supra notes 231-34 and
accompanying text.
262. See U.N. CHAwrER arts. 24, 32, 50 (referencing to disputes involving nonMembers of U.N.); see also id. art. 2(6).
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form of universal jurisdiction over individuals-that is,jurisdiction without
regard to an individual's connection with any State Party to the ICC Statute, any State that has accepted the Court's jurisdiction or, conceivably,
any State that is a member of the U.N. Through the same device, the
Court may also be asked to recognize and exercise its jurisdiction over
263
States that are not parties to the Statute.
Whether and how the Court can exercise unlimited personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction over all States is an important aspect of the definitions
of the international powers and responsibilities-the international legal
personality-of the ICC. Universal jurisdiction over individuals suspected
or accused in situations referred by the Security Council also affects
changing views of international legal personality of individuals. The questions require that the U.N. Charter and the ICC Statute be read together.
Articles 12 and 13 of the ICC Statute assume that the Court has personal jurisdiction over any individuals suspected of crimes within the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction where the Security Council refers the
situation to the Court. No language elsewhere in the Statute contradicts
this reading in specific terms. It is nonetheless problematic in light of
some protections of individual human rights in the Statute and international law in general. There is also a section on temporal jurisdiction from
which an argument can be constructed that universal jurisdiction is not in
fact the rule of the Statute.
One could simply end the matter here by saying that the language of
the ICC Statute controls the personal jurisdiction of the Court. 2 6 4 Natural
persons not having international legal personality in traditional international law cannot object to rules of international law and there is no need
2 65
to go any further.
Modern notions of legitimacy and changes in the view of the personality of the individual in international law (including changes manifested
in the ICC Statute), however, suggest that there should be some further
reasoned basis for the exercise of power over an individual by the Court.
The legitimacy of imposing the Court's process on an individual becomes
an issue, when that person, 266 and his or her international representative
263. For further discussion of how this jurisdiction over States is very limited,
see Gallant, supra note 3.
264. See VCOLT, supra note 45, art. 31 (describing plain meaning rule).
265. Some objections of the Nuremberg defendants seem to have been handled in this way. The International Military Tribunal relied principally on its own
Charter as authority rather than investigating the individual defendants' claims.
See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 38, at 218. The Tribunal was seen not as an
international organization, but as a body that had been set up by a number of
States. Each State that was occupying territory in Germany could have done the
same individually.
266. In most legal systems, an individual can waive lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense. One can imagine a case where a person would rather be tried by
an international tribunal, even if there was a lack of personal jurisdiction, than by a
national court with jurisdiction, as in the case of participants in the Rwanda genocide, who are subject to the death penalty only in the national courts. SeeJONES,
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(i.e., his or her State), have not consented to jurisdiction therein. One
must rely on the underlying fairness of the constitution of the Court and
the substantive and procedural law to be applied by the Court.
1.

Theory that Security Council Referral Can Legitimately CreateJurisdiction
over an Individual with a Relevant Connection to a U.N. Member State

One theory of personal jurisdiction applies to most crimes within the
Court's subject matterjurisdiction, at least for nationals of any State that is
a U.N. Member, or a person who acted on, or with effect on a U.N. Member State. The Security Council, in the exercise of its enforcement power
to maintain or restore international peace and security, has the authority
to give an international tribunal jurisdiction over what are already customary international crimes. This tribunal may have personal jurisdiction over
any individual with a relationship to a U.N. Member State (e.g., nationalconsent of that
ity, place of action or effect), without regard to the actual267
State to the jurisdiction of the tribunal over that person.
This is essentially the theory behind the creation and operation of the
ad hoc U.N. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.268 The creation of the
ICTR may have added the element that the Security Council may also declare that an international tribunal has jurisdiction over non-customary
treaty-based crimes, where that treaty has been ratified by relevant
States. 2 69 Rwanda voted against the creation of the ICTR, but since then
has largely cooperated with the Tribunal, which has exercised jurisdiction
over persons arrested both in Rwanda and elsewhere. Additionally, the
consent of the various successor States to the Former Yugoslavia has not
been seen as necessary to personal jurisdiction over any accused in the
ICTY, and many States have cooperated with the ICTY in bringing accused
persons to justice. Thus, this theory has support both in State practice and
the organizational practice of the U.N.
Jurisdiction to adjudicate created by referral by the Security Council
to the ICC, an independent international organization with a treaty relationship with the U.N., 27 0 is equally legitimate. Suppose, for example, a
situation involving a State that is not party to the ICC Statute (but is a
Member of the U.N.), is referred by the Security Council to the Court. A
national of the non-Party State is accused of a crime committed wholly on
supra note 76, at 525 (quoting Statement of Ambassador Bakuamutsa of Rwanda,
Debate on Security Council Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (8 November 1994)).
267. See Flavia Lattanzi, The Rome Statute and State Sovereignty: 1CC Competence,
JurisdictionalLinks, Trigger Mechanism, in LATTANZI & SCHABAS, supra note 3, at 51,
60-64.
268. While the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) lost
its vote in the General Assembly for some time after the dissolution of the Former
Yugoslavia, it never left the U.N., nor ceased to be bound by the U.N. Charter.
269. For further discussion on the inclusion of crimes under Additional Protocol No. II in the ICTR Statute, see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
270. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 2.
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the territory of that State. Despite its legal obligation to cooperate with
the Court and to accept its jurisdiction, the non-Party State refuses to do
1
If the accused person is found on the territory of a State fulfilling its
so. 27
Court, that perobligation under the U.N. Charter to cooperate with 2the
72
son could be arrested and brought before the Court.
273
This reading makes sense given the purposes of the ICC Statute
and the historical background of prosecutions in international criminal
tribunals. One of the main purposes of the ICC Statute at the time of its
adoption was to end the need for the creation by the Security Council of a
series of ad hoc tribunals to deal with situations of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes. To achieve this purpose, the Court needs to
have personal jurisdiction over the same individuals that the Security
Council could give jurisdiction over by creating ad hoc tribunals.
This discussion, as that of effects jurisdiction and passive personality
jurisdiction, fits comfortably within the rubric ofjurisdiction to adjudicate,
as well as jurisdiction to prescribe. However, one issue may legitimately
concern the authority to prescribe criminal law.
If there are non-customary crimes covered by the ICC Statute, a Security Council referral raises an issue of jurisdiction to prescribe international criminal law. It appears that the ICC Statute contemplates that all
crimes defined in the Statute may be prosecuted in situations referred by

271. Any obligation on a non-Party State to the ICC Statute to cooperate with
the Court after a Security Council referral must arise from the State's obligation to

implement resolutions of the Security Council under Chapters V and VII of the
U.N. Charter, and not from the Statute itself. See generally Gallant, supra note 3;
Lattanzi, supra note 267; see also Sadat & Carden, supra note 10, at 404 n.129 (referring to Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 34-36 (Appeals Chamber
1995)) (discussing interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction allowing Security Council
resolution as basis forjurisdiction of ICTY). For an article expressing some doubts

about whether Security Council actions truly bind U.N. Member States to cooperate with the ICC, see Pietro Gargiulo, The ControversialRelationship between the International CriminalCourt and the Security Council, in LArrANzi & SCHABAS, supra note 3,
at 67, 78-82 n.30-35 (containing citations to collection of many points of view from
several languages and legal cultures on this issue). The ICC Statute provides no
mechanism for non-Party States to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in cases of
referral by the Security Council. But see ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(3)
(describing mechanism for non-Party State to accept jurisdiction in cases of referral by party State or investigation by Prosecutor proprio motu). Thus, refusal to
cooperate with the Court will be the clearest sign of a non-Party State's refusal to
accept the jurisdiction of the Court.
272. This scenario is not far-fetched. Some of the persons wanted by the
ICTY were arrested in Germany, a State known to be cooperating with the ICTY,
and persons wanted by the ICTR were arrested elsewhere. One can also imagine
this occurring where a person wanted for crime is traveling to or through a cooperating State to purchase weapons on the illegal market in order to commit a crime
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC.
273. See VCOLT, supra note 45, art. 31(1) (stating text of treaty is to be interpreted in light of its object and purpose).
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the Security Council. 2 74 If a crime is non-customary, though, this implies
an authority in the U.N., acting through the Security Council, and using
the device of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 27 5 to prescribe international criminal law that did not previously exist for the persons or States involved.
This would be a development of international legislative authority beyond what is normally articulated as acceptable today. If the question were
asked generally, "Does the U.N. Security Council have jurisdiction to prescribe general international criminal law by defining crimes that do not
exist in customary international law?," most scholars, international lawyers
and diplomats would answer, "No." None of the principal organs of the
U.N.-the General Assembly, the Security Council and the ICJ-have general legislative competence.
The actual question posed by the referral mechanism is, however,
somewhat narrower: "Does the Security Council have jurisdiction to prescribe international criminal law by defining crimes that do not exist in
customary international law, if proscription of the non-customary crimes
would be a step towards the restoration and maintenance of international
peace and security in a specific situation?" There is some ambiguous evidence in current practice, and stronger evidence in theory, that the answer to this question is 'Yes."
The Report of the Secretary General which led to the creation of the
ICTY stated that the Secretary General took care to include only crimes
that are "beyond doubt part of customary [international humanitarian]
law" in its sections on substantive criminal law, so that issues concerning
2 76
treaties that some but not all relevant states adhered to did not arise.
Included in the conventional law that had "beyond doubt become part of
international customary law" 277 were the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims. 278 The 1977 Protocols were
not, however, mentioned in the Report, or included in the Statute of the
ICTY as a source of the definition of crimes. By contrast, when the Security Council created the ICTR a year later, it included as crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal those defined by Additional Protocol II of
1977, as well as the original 1949 Geneva Conventions. 27 9 This suggests
274. See SADAT, supra note 10, at 12 (stating that Security Council may apply

"to citizens of party and non-Party States alike, the substantive criminal law embedded in the Statute").

275. That is, if there are non-customary crimes in the ICC Statute, the referral
by the Security Council is an international legal act, which prescribes criminal law
for the situation. The substantive criminal law prescribed is any non-customary
crime contained in the text of the ICC Statute.
276. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, para. 34.
277. Id. para. 35.

278. 75 U.N.T.S. 970, 970-973.
279. See ICTR Statute, supra note 75, art. 4. Further evidence of a practice of
Security Council prescription concerning crimes (i.e., terrorism) is discussed supra
Part II(E)
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that the Security Council believes that it can prescribe international criminal law that may be non-customary, as it has given jurisdiction to the ICTR
over crimes that it had not determined in 1993 were without doubt
customary.
One must view this evidence with great care, however. Rwanda was,
by 1994, a party to Additional Protocol II of 1977. As discussed above, the
Security Council may have believed it had the authority to create a Tribunal with jurisdiction over non-customary treaty-based crimes only in States
that had adopted the treaty. 211 This limited view would be more consistent with the principle of nulla crimen than the general view that the Security Council can create new crimes. Unlike the ICTY, whose statutory
jurisdiction has no closing date, the ICTR is limited to trying offenses that
happened in 1994, so the creation of new crimes in the ICTR Statute
28 1
could not have been based on a long-term preventive function.
Theoretical considerations suggest the Security Council does have
this jurisdiction to prescribe new crimes where necessary to carry out its
mandate. Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council
may make a determination that proscription of those crimes will lead to
the restoration or maintenance of peace and security. In this sense, criminal prescription is like any other device that the Security Council uses.
Such a device need not be specifically mentioned in the U.N. Charter to
be valid.
Any prosecution of non-customary crimes following a Security Council referral must, however, comply with the nulla crimen/non-retroactivity

rules of the ICC Statute and customary international law. 282 That is, one
could not prosecute non-customary crimes (at least where no applicable
treaty or national law2 83 provides alternate prescriptive authority), unless
those crimes occurred after the time of the referral.
This theory concerning Security Council authority is not the same as
true universal jurisdiction. It grants the Court jurisdiction only over those
persons who bear some relationship (e.g., nationality of perpetrator or
victim, place of action or effect) to a State that has consented to the U.N.
280. For further discussion on ratification of Additional Protocol No. II by
Rwanda, see supra notes 75-76, 94. Persons interested in separation of powers issues will note that when the international community creates a crime, whether by
formation of customary international law (or jus cogens) or by a treaty regime, obligations are legislated for individuals that do not necessarily go through the constitutionally prescribed legislative process of any given State. This Article will not
consider all the implications of this fact, but intellectual honesty requires that it be
noted.
281. Compare ICTR Statute, supra note 75, art. 1, with ICTY Statute, supranote
94, art. 1; see aLso supra notes 134-36 (discussing Prosecutor v. Milosevic).
282. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 21(3), 22. For a discussion of nulla
crimen/non-retroactivity in the context of Security Council referrals, see infra Part
VI (B) (3).
283. Cf. Special Court Statute, supra note 11 (giving international organization authority to prosecute specific crimes tinder national law of Sierra Leone).
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Charter, including the Security Council's authority. The theory for exercising jurisdiction to adjudicate over an individual in international criminal law remains the relevant connection of that individual with some State.
There need not be a claim that the Court can exercise jurisdiction directly
over all individuals.
Although the theory discussed here creates criminal jurisdiction over
individuals rather than rights for them, this theory would represent consolidation of the international legal personality of individuals, and an extension of the international legal personality of individuals with respect to
international organizations. The ICC Statute does provide for the other
side of the international legal personality of individuals. They have rights
in the Court and against the Court as an international organization.
These include both procedural and substantive rights within the Court
and, in some cases, monetary remedies against the ICC itself. These apply
in all matters before the Court, whether referred by a State, initiated
proprio motu by the Prosecutor or, indeed, referred by the Security Council.
Professor Sadat argues that non-customary law in the ICC Statute is
prescribed by the Rome Conference that wrote the ICC Statute, rather
than by the Security Council, when there is a Security Council referral. 28 4
This is an important development in international law, because the ICC
Statute was adopted in a "quasi-legislative" manner-by a non-unanimous
vote. 285 Moreover, not all States that might be affected by a Security
Council referral were present at the Rome Conference. To the extent that
new law exists in the ICC Statute, it can be imposed on States that in no
way consented to its creation, on their nationals and on those acting in
their territory, by the Security Council.
If the nulla crimen analysis suggested here 28 6 is followed, then the ICC
Statute would mean an evolution, but not a revolution, in the way international law is made. The Security Council would be the principal prescribing authority of new criminal law when it makes a referral to the Court. It
is the entity determining that defining all the prohibited acts in the ICC
Statute as crimes would aid in the restoration or maintenance of international peace and security. However, it would not be defining criminal law
retroactively for persons without a relevant connection to a State that has
accepted the ICC Statute.
Realistically, however, Sadat is correct that the new law to be applied
following Security Council referral would be the international criminal law
adopted by the Rome Conference. The Security Council cannot define
new crimes and place them within the Court's jurisdiction. The ICC, as an
international organization, is bound by its constituent document-the
284. See SADAT, supra note 10, at 11-14, 16-17.

285. The Law of the Sea Conference provides a precedent for this way of
developing law. See id. at 13.
286. For further discussion of the nulla crimen analysis, see supra notes 236-47,
282 and accompanying text; see also infra Part VI(B)(3).
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ICC Statute-that only grants it jurisdiction over the specific crimes the
Statute contains. 2 8 7 Definition of crimes by the Rome Conference for application where needed by the Security Council is an evolution in the way
international criminal law is made. This is because the Rome Conference
acted quasi-legislatively, and without unanimity. But, because the Security
Council is accepted as an authority for establishing international criminal
jurisdiction, the process of prescription by Council referral is not a major
break in the international lawmaking tradition.
In short, the notion of near-universal jurisdiction of the Court following a Security Council referral is consistent with the development of international organization law and international criminal law. The limitations
on jurisdiction under this theory are only that the persons charged with
crime must have some relevant connection to a U.N. Member State, and
the application of law must comply with the principle of nulla crimen sine
lege.--"No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute unless
the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime
288
within the jurisdiction of the Court."
2.

True UniversalJurisdiction and the Power of the International Community
to Legislate for All Individuals and States, Including Non-Members of the
U.N. and Persistent Objectors to Customary InternationalLaw

A second basis for supporting jurisdiction over any individual accused
of crimes within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court is the theory
of true universal jurisdiction to adjudicate. Originally, this doctrine held
that all States have authority to prosecute those who commit the most heinous international crimes, such as genocide. 28 9 Nothing in the doctrine
of universal jurisdiction prevents its application in international as well as
national courts.2 90 The ICJ recently indicated that such universal jurisdiction is even more justifiable in the case of international criminal tribunals,
287. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 5-9.
288. Id. art. 21(1).
289. See, e.g.,
UNITED STArEs

RESTATEMENT

(TiRD)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Lxw OF TIHE

§ 404 (1987) (discussing universal jurisdiction to prescribe punish-

ment for "certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal
concern"). Israel has tried and either punished (e.g., Isr. v. Adolf Eichmann,

Crim. App. No. 361/61 (lsr. 1962)) or acquitted on appeal (Isr. v. Demjanjuk (Isr.
1993)) persons alleged to be involved in genocide where the crimes took place
ouside Israeli territory at a time when the State of Israel did not exist. See PYLF,
supra note 184, at chs. 18, 19. But see Arrest Warrant, supra note 6, para. 5 (Separate Opinion of Guillaume, J.) (noting true universal jurisdiction traditionally existed in case of piracy only); J. STARKE., INTrRODUCTION TrO INTERNATIONAL LAw 234
(10th ed. 1989) (noting only piracy jure gentium and war crimes are clear cases in
which there is currently true universaljurisdiction). It would seem difficult to state
that there is no universal jurisdiction at least in cases of genocide committed by
mass murder. For more on the debate on the existence of jus cogens crimes, see
infra note 299 and accompanying text.
290. Cf NurembergJudgment, supra note 38, at 218 (noting nations together
may create court to try cases they could each try in their own courts).
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including the ICC. 29 1 This is true whether an international court is perceived as receiving its authority by delegation of national judicial power
from the States creating it, or by agreement of the international community to create a new judicial power in accordance with international
human rights norms. Either way, prohibitions of these most heinous
crimes are part of customary international law292 and should be enforceable either by any State in the international system 293 or by an international
judicial authority established by States for the purpose of enforcing them.
If the true universal jurisdiction theory is accepted, the Security Council can, by the referral of a situation to the Court, bring any person, regardless of nationality or place of acting, within the power of the Court. A
Security Council referral is required under the Statute before a person
alleged to be involved in crimes specified in the Statute can lawfully be
hauled into the Court, 294 even though the theory of universal jurisdiction
in national courts requires no general analogue to the referral mechanism. This was one of the political compromises necessary to achieve the
near-consensus of the Rome Conference on the ICC Statute. Even though
the mechanism may not be necessary under a theory of universal jurisdiction, it does provide a reminder that lawful authority over a person must
exist before any Court can legitimately act against' that person.
The theory of true universal jurisdiction, whether applied in the ICC
or in national courts, poses a question of legitimacy in democratic theory. 29 5 Universal jurisdiction to adjudicate in the Court implies universal
jurisdiction to prescribe in some combination of the ICC as an interna-

291. See Arrest Warrant, supra note 6, paras. 15, 26.
292. The discourse generally speaks of customary international criminal law.
However, what is usually not discussed is dissent from customary norms. These
customary international crimes may therefore appear to fall under the rubric of jus
cogens, binding customary law from which there can be no dissent.
293. The State recently associated most closely with the doctrine of universal
jurisdiction to adjudicate, Belgium, may be limiting it judicially. An appellate
court recently ruled that the Belgian courts can exercise universal jurisdiction over
persons accused of customary international crimes committed anywhere in the
world, but only if the defendant can be found in the territory of Belgium. If the
defendant is not in Belgium, the case is "inadmissible." See Court: Sharon case inadmissible, June 26, 2002, available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/
06/26/sharon.belgium/index.html (last visited July 10, 2002). Legislative limitation of universal jurisdiction in Belgium is also occurring. See Belgium Restricts 'Genocide Law', BBC NEWS, Apr. 6, 2003, available at, http://news.bbe.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/2921519.stm (last visited May 23, 2003).
294. Obviously, this does not apply to cases properly referred by a State, or
initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu, which have separate grounds for personal
jurisdiction, discussed supra Part V.
295. True universal jurisdiction, when applied by States, poses similar issues
to those discussed in the text, as well as the issue of legitimacy if the State seeking
to apply universal jurisdiction is itself undemocratic or its court system biased.
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tional organization, the States that have established the Court, the Security
29
Council or the international community as a whole. !
Objections to true universal jurisdiction on grounds of legitimacy
have at least two bases. First, a crime in the ICC Statute may not be customary, and thus may not bind all persons. Second, the State of which an
accused person is a national might be a non-Member of the U.N., or might
be a persistent objector to the customary rule of international criminal law
that forms the basis for the accusations. 297 In the case of persistent objection, the accused is not part of a body politic that has consented to the
substantive rules of law that will apply. In the case of nationals of nonMember States who have no connection with acts in a Member State, the
accused is not part of a body politic that has consented, directly or indirectly, to the existence of, or referral of cases to the ICC.
True universal jurisdiction follows naturally from the scheme of the
ICC Statute and general international law for any crime that is jus cogens, a
peremptory international law from which there can be no derogation.
The claim that a criminal prohibition is jus cogens is a claim that acts that
violate it are criminal wherever they occur. If any democratic justification
of jus cogens criminal jurisdiction is necessary, it is that the international
community is sufficiently coherent and democratic and that, as a whole, it
can justly formulate and impose a few sufficiently definite rules against
exceptionally evil acts that apply to all States and individuals. It does not
depend on the existence of the U.N. or membership of any particular
298
State in it.

The international community-or some substantial part of it-can
also establish an organization, in this case the ICC, which would justly have
power to try such offenses, including jurisdiction to adjudicate over all
persons. Trial for such acts by the international community is appropriate, regardless of the place of the crime or the nationality of the accused
or the victims, or the national makeup of the international organization
that is conducting the trial. Otherwise, the claim that the law involved is
peremptory and allows no derogation is undercut, for derogation from the
law (impunity) would be allowed for those outside of the U.N. system.
Suppose genocide conducted by the mass murder of a targeted ethnic
group occurs in a State that is not a Member of the U.N. or a party to the
ICC Statute. The U.N. Security Council refers the situation to the ICC.
There is simply no injustice when persons are brought before this Court
for allegedly committing crimes that are condemned by the world commu296. In the case of national tribunals applying universal jurisdiction, the national court must also have jurisdiction to prescribe for all persons by absorbing
the rules prescribed by international law into national law.
297. It is assumed in this sentence that the crime charged is customary, but is
not jus cogens.
298. This is not to deny that the U.N. may have had a part in crystallizing such
a rule into jus cogens. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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nity as a whole. A penal law that is jus cogens gains its legitimacy from this
general condemnation.
There are, however, questions about how many crimes fall in the category of jus cogens, and a few theoretical questions about whether jus cogens
exists as a category at all. 2 99 Those who wrote the ICC Statute included
one indication that they believed genocide and crimes against humanity to
fall into a category of crimes that are universally condemned so strongly
that everyone should be presumed to know that they are unlawful: the
Statute states that an order to commit such a crime is "manifestly unlawful." 30° ° While the purpose of this provision is to limit a ground for excluding criminal responsibility, the theory behind such a limitation does go to
the knowledge that one may be expected to have of the universal condemnation of these acts.
This may prove to be a useful explanation for universal jurisdiction
over jus cogens crimes. It does not require that one be an advocate of natural law theories ofjurisprudence in order to accept jus cogens.30° The possibility of a broad political consensus across States and societies about what
is criminally wrong-a positivist conception-is sufficient. This does not
of course purport to end the debate over natural and positive law. 3 112 One
can still debate about how one determines what few acts are so evil that we
299. See, e.g., VCOLT, supra note 45, arts. 53, 64 (assuming existence of peremptory norms from which there can be no derogation), discussed in 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 169, 247-49 (1966) (mentioning as possible jus cogens principles treaties
among States "contemplating or conniving at ... trade in slaves, piracy or genocide"); Roberto Ago, The Law of Treaties in Light of the Vienna Convention, [1971-II]
134 HAGUE RECUEIL 297, 324 n.37, translated in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER 143 (Burns Weston et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997) (discussing norms prohibiting
genocide, slavery, racial discrimination and protection of rights essential to human
person in times of war); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 515 (noting that "least
controversial examples ... are the prohibition of the use of force, the law of genocide, the principle of racial non-discrimination, crimes against humanity, and the
rules prohibiting trade in slaves and piracy" (footnotes omitted)); JANIS, supra note
16, at 62-64 (viewing "jus cogens as a modern form of natural law;" possibility of
such law is "hotly controverted by positivists"); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (R.Y. Jennings & A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (containing similar wording to
I.L.C. material); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
222-24 (2d ed. 1984) (arguing that logic and morality suggest prohibition of slave
trade and genocide are jus cogens norms). For a collection of sources from many
languages and legal cultures, both asserting and denying the existence of jus cogens
norms in international law and concluding that a class of such norms exists, see
G.I. TUNRIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 145-60 (William E. Butler trans.,
1974).
300. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 33(2). The consequence of such an
order being manifestly unlawful is that superior orders and prescription of law can
never be raised as grounds for relief from criminal responsibility in the case of
these crimes. See Id. art. 33(1).
301. AccordJANlS, supra note 16, at 62-64.
302. For some of the theoretical debate whetherjus cogens norms are a species
of customary norms or something different, compare BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at
515 (describing type of customary law), withJANIS, supra note 16, at 62-64 (characterizing jus cogens norms as "natural law").
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as a world society find them to be peremptory norms of international law
from which there can be no derogation. It would also be possible for a
positivist of a realist school to accept that there is actually a consensus
among societies on an issue like this; while a positivist who focuses on the
formalist need for an identifiable lawmaker to deny that there is in fact a
sufficiently coherent international community sensibly to say it has created
these norms.' ° 3 The current author accepts the view that a consensus on
the content of international law strong enough to constitute jus cogens can
exist, and at least in the case of genocide by mass killing, does exist.
The true universal jurisdiction argument is tested by the intermediate
case of customary international crimes that are not necessarily jus cogens.
Most of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are, without much
question, crimes under customary international law. 30 4 The crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court are "limited to the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole." 30 5 In general, there
has not been persistent objection by States to the creation of customary
norms forbidding genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and
from the Nuremberg Judgment onward, international criminal courts
3 0° 6
have not devoted substantial portions of their opinions to this issue.
Here, the legitimacy argument may require slightly more than the
claim of jus cogens. Under traditional views of customary international law,
the argument requires that individuals be bound by customary international law that a State to which they have a relevant connection has not

303. See Rubin, supra note 87, at 265 (arguing that no consensus exists).
304. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, paras. 33-49.
305. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1).

306. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 53, para. 35. By contrast,
there has been a great deal of controversy overjust how far crimes against humanity and war crimes stretch. For example, at the time of the adoption of the ICTY
Statute, the 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions were not listed as
among those conventions that have "beyond doubt become part of customary international law." There is sometimes dispute over whether specific uses of force
against civilians occurred during "armed conflict not of an international character" or during "internal disturbances and tensions" not amounting to "armed conflict"-only in the former case does the ICC Statute purport to apply the law of war
crimes. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2) (d) (using language quoted in defining war crimes). One recent example of a dispute over the applicability of the
definition of war crimes is the debate over Russia's refusal to allow international
observation of the situation in Chechniya, which Russia claims is an internal matter. The Government of Israel has also questioned whether the prohibition of
torture applies to all applications of force to individuals to obtain information, or
only to more serious ones, though the Supreme Court of Israel has ruled against
the practice of using "moderate physical pressure" against Palestinian detainees.
See Israel 'Torture' Methods Illegal, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 1999, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middleeast/newsid_4390000/439554.stm.
The Supreme Court of Israel rejected methods approved in Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General Security Service
(GSS) Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity (the "Landau Report") (1987).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/2

72

Gallant: Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in Inter

2003]

JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS

835

opted out of through persistent objection.30 7 Individuals do not yet have
a direct voice in the creation of international law, which remains primarily
the province of governments, and, increasingly, international organizations. Although civil society (non-governmental organizations) may be
taking a greater role (for example in pressuring governments to create the
Rome Statute for the ICC) one cannot say that most individuals had a
voice in the drafting of that treaty outside of the voice of their government. Even in the current age in which the individual is gaining greater
international personality, it is still generally the case that individuals become criminally responsible in international law because they are citizens
of a State to which the law applies, or act in or with effect on a State (or its
nationals) to which the law applies.
Once it is determined that a type of act constitutes a customary international crime, it is, wherever (outside of a persistent objector) it takes
place, "at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
308
ExerCourt"-i.e., within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court.
cise of personal jurisdiction over, and punishment of, the perpetrator is
fair under principles of international human rights law, which is applicable in the Court as well as to and in the States. 30 9 As with jus cogens there is
no need for the perpetrator to have a relevant connection with a U.N.
Member State, or a State Party to the ICC Statute.
The fairness of jurisdiction in the ICC is, in this case, no different
from the fairness of universal jurisdiction in the court of any State into
whose hands the accused might fall.310 The ICC is bound by international
human rights norms, 31 1 as courts of States should be. It will have judges
from many States and different legal systems, and will be less likely to suffer from the biases that might exist in a single State's system. This system
is also designed to allow for fair trials even though referrals from the Security Council involve a political process, in the same ways national judiciaries should be designed to conduct fair trials even if political factors
influence a decision to investigate a matter.
307. See Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106
COURS 1, 49 (1962-1I) (pointing out that persistent objection must

RECUEIL DES

occur during period of formation of customary norm). This assumes that there
are no other ways for nations to opt out of customary international criminal law.

For example, the argument that newly decolonized States do not take on the entire preexisting apparatus of customary international law as obligatory does not
apply here. See id. at 49-53. At the very least, the law out of which the decolonized
states may opt does not include the criminal law of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In fact, there does not seem to be much evidence that
decolonized States believe they should not be bound by this part of international
criminal law.
308. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 22.
309. See id. art. 21(3).
310. Cf Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 38, at 218 (stating that international tribunal established by States may prosecute international crimes that any
State could have prosecuted).
311. See id. art. 21(3).
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Where there has been persistent objection by a non-Member of the
U.N., however, jurisdiction under the ICC Statute may not be quite universal. Under traditional views of customary international law, the citizen of a
persistent objector acting with effect only in a persistent objector State
against such State's nationals is in a situation similar to that of a person
allegedly committing a non-customary crime in a non-Party State to the
ICC Statute. There is no evidence that the creation of the U.N. Charter or
the ICC Statute has modified or eliminated the persistent objector exception to the universality of customary international law.
An accused ought to be allowed to make a claim that he or she has no
relevant connection with any State to which the law applies, and to be
released in the rare case that no such connection exists. Such cases would
be limited to internal armed conflicts in persistent objector States, or in-

ternational wars among such States, and to such customary crimes as there
has been actual persistent objection from the time of the formation of the
custom. Here, the lack of personal jurisdiction follows the lack ofjurisdiction in the international community-whether conceived as the Court, the
U.N. or both-to prescribe rules of criminal law applicable to individuals
in the persistent objector State.
The U.N. Security Council, even when exercising its Chapter VII authority to restore and maintain peace and security, cannot, consistent with
contemporary international law and practice, be a general criminal legislative authority for persons connected only with non-Member States. This
follows from the traditional view that treaties, including the U.N. Charter,
3 12
do not bind third States without their consent.
Some scholars are challenging this notion, arguing that the U.N.
Charter creates a constitution for the international community that cannot be ignored by non-Member States, 31 3 or by individuals connected only
with such States. "Inasmuch as the activity of individuals can have a bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security, they too can
be addressees of Security Council decisions." 3 14 This suggests that the Security Council can prescribe criminal law (in this case by referral) for individuals with no relevant connection to a U.N. Member State.
It certainly was contemplated that the Security Council would need to
take enforcement action against non-Member States, particularly the "enemy states" of World War 11. 3 15 It is also the case that the Charter intends
that general principles of peaceful relations among States and sovereign
312. See, e.g., VCOLT, supra note 45, art. 34.
313. See, e.g., Sadat & Carden, supra note 10, at 410 n.167 (relying on Bardo
Fassbender, The U.N. Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36

COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529, 574-78 (1998), and recognizing as contrary Herman
Mosler, The InternationalSociety as a Legal Community, 140 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 20507 (1974)).
314. Fassbender, supra note 313, at 610; see also Sadat & Carden, supra note
10, at 410 n.167.

315. See U.N.

CHARTER

art. 53(2).
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equality of States be observed by all States, whether or not U.N. Members. 3 16 By now, these general principles of peaceful relations and sovereign equality are customary international law.
There is, however, a great distance between that fact and the claim
that specific decisions made by the Security Council bind non-Member
States, especially when there is no legal requirement that the non-Member
State be able to participate in the decision, and the non-Member State
cannot vote.3 17 The Charter does not even claim that these non-Member
States have an obligation to accept and carry out Security Council resolutions; only Member States must do so.3' 18 That is, there is no basis for
claiming the right to require a non-Member State to agree to withdraw its
persistent objection to a particular customary crime, or that nationals of
such a State may not claim the protection from prosecution afforded by
the inapplicability of the rule.

The Reparations Case 19 stands only for the proposition that an international organization such as the U.N. can have international legal personality sufficient to allow it to make claims on non-Member States for
wrongs done to its officials under international law. It does not purport to
assert for the U.N. or any other international organization the authority to
prescribe law that non-Members or their nationals (acting wholly within
their confines) must follow.
The applicable principle, limiting jurisdiction over the person here is
nulla crimen sine lege.3 2 1 Where there is no appropriate lawmaking authority, there is no law that the individual is required to obey.
Without Security Council jurisdiction to prescribe a new, non-customary international crime for individuals without a relevant connection to a
U.N. Member State, the Council cannot, by referral to the ICC, create
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that an individual has committed such a
crime. Where a crime is non-customary, only those within the ambit of the
substantive law prescriptive jurisdiction of the Security Council may be
prosecuted. The argument against personal jurisdiction here is the same
as in the case involving persistent objector States above, only it is stronger,
because there is (by hypothesis) no consensus in the international community that the acts involved are criminal.
These limitations on universal jurisdiction should not be a matter of
grave concern. The theory of universal criminal jurisdiction depends on
the crime being of universal concern among nations. Any such crime
would, by definition, have already passed into customary international law.
Nor has there been persistent objection to the most important norms of
international criminal law, such as the prohibition against genocide by
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

See id. art. 2.
See id. art. 32.
See id. art. 25.
1949 L.C.J. 174.
See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 22.
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mass murder. These limitations on universal jurisdiction are of important
theoretical, and possibly political, 3 2 1 concern. They should be recognized. Otherwise the Court's mission of punishing and deterring the
worst crimes against humanity and the international community may become entangled in political debate concerning alleged overreaching of
authority by an international organization.
3.

Universal PersonalJurisdiction,Jurisdiction to Prescribe and the Nulla
Crimen/Retroactivity Problem

Universal personal jurisdiction-that is, universal (or universal within
the U.N.) jurisdiction to adjudicate allegations of international crimerequires that there be authority in the international community to define
substantive international criminal law for all individuals-that is, the international community has jurisdiction to prescribe for all individuals. 322 Indeed, if either a national tribunal or the ICC claims true universal
jurisdiction over individuals,32 3 it follows that it is claiming that the substantive crimes it is prosecuting through that jurisdiction are jus cogens,
international law from which there can be no derogation, or at the very
least, that there has been in fact no effective objection by a relevant State
to the customary international norm that an individual is accused of
violating.
The problem that some crimes (such as enlisting soldiers under fifteen years old or crimes against the environment 24 ) defined under the
ICC Statute may not currently be customary international crimes, causing
a problem of nulla crimen sine lege/non-retroactivity for persons without a
relevant connection to States party to the ICC Statute at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, raises its head again here. 325 In this
case, the referral by the Security Council to the Court, alleging that crimes
within the Court's jurisdiction may have been committed, plays the same
role in setting up the nulla crimen problem as a retroactively effective acceptance ofjurisdiction of the ICC by a non-Party State to the ICC Statute
321. Most worrisome is the possibility of the violent breakup of a State into
several smaller States that do not accept the U.N. Charter. While all of the new
States of the former Yugoslavia acceded to the Charter, the next time a country
dissolves into civil war the same might not happen.
322. In the case of national tribunals applying universal jurisdiction, there
must also be jurisdiction in the national court to prescribe for all persons by absorbing the rules prescribed by international law into national law, whether by
appropriate legislation or (in some common law countries) case decision.
323. If the U.N. and the ICC claim authority to adjudicate cases concerning
all individuals with a relevant connection to a U.N. Member, jurisdiction may exist
regardless of whether that State has ratified the ICC Statute.
324. See Sierra Leone Report, supra note 89, paras. 17-18.
325. For further discussion of problem of nulla crimen sine lege/non-retroactivity for persons without a relevant connection to States who are party to the ICC
Statute at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, see supra Part V(B) (2).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol48/iss3/2

76

Gallant: Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in Inter
2003]

JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS

839

does in the case of a referral by a State, or an investigation by the Prosecutor proprio motu.
Although the following discussion is based upon the debatable hypothetical that there are non-customary crimes in the ICC Statute, it is again
worth entering into to explicate an important issue concerning any attempt to create a criminal court with worldwide (or nearly world-wide)
authority. It is not enough to say, as we all too easily do sometimes, that
"war crimes" are prohibited by international law, without looking at the
specific crime named to see if it is in fact customary.
If the crime was not defined as customary (or as a crime in the law of
a relevant State) at the time of commission of the act, a prosecution for an
act committed before the Security Council referral would violate the principles of non-retroactivity and nulla crimen sine lege embodied in the ICC
Statute, which states, "A person shall not be criminally responsible under
this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes
3' 26
place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
An act that is criminalized only under the ICC Statute (i.e., is not a
crime under customary international law) is in general not a crime at the
time committed, if committed by a national of a non-Party State outside
the territory of any State Party and with no effect in a State Party or on a
national of a State Party. 327 This is because, at the time the person commits the conduct, there has not been any law that criminalizes it. Reference to the Court by the Security Council as an enforcement measure
under Chapter VII does not change this fact, except for persons who act
after the referral. Indeed, as discussed above, the Security Council may
not legislate non-customary international crimes, even prospectively, for
those with no relevant connection to a U.N. Member State.
For a person with no relevant connection to a State Party to the ICC
Statute who acts before a referral, the ICC Statute's principle of "non-retroactivity ratione personad' applies: "In the event of a change in the law
applicable to a given case prior to a final judgment, the law more favorable
to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply." 328
Any attempt to apply a crime defined only by the ICC Statute (and not by
applicable custom or relevant national statute) to a person that the crime
did not cover when the act was committed would be a change in the law.
The law more favorable to the person, making him or her not responsible
for the crime, should be applied. Thus, a referral by the Security Council
of a situation in which crimes that were not customary had been committed and where the States concerned have not accepted the crimes into
326. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
327. See id. The hypotheses in the text sentence are meant to exclude all the
traditional bases of criminal jurisdiction other than universal jurisdiction as identified by Harvard Research. See Dickinson et al., supra note 218, at 435. Note, however, that this work was done in the context of national criminal jurisdiction before
the creation of international criminal courts.
328. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 24(2).
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their law should result, under the ICC Statute, in refusal to bring or confirm charges, or an acquittal for the non-customary crimes, at least if committed before the referral.
The nulla crimen and non-retroactivity principles are not specifically
stated as matters of personal jurisdiction in the ICC Statute; they are stated
as matters of criminal responsibility of the individual. 32 ' Fairly enforcing
these provisions, however, meets the goal of personal jurisdiction requirements: ensuring essential fairness whenever requiring a person to answer
an allegation of crime before a court.
This places upon the distinction between customary international
crimes and crimes that are merely treaty based a certain burden that the
distinction between these two types of law originally bore.""" It is bound
to encourage litigation concerning whether specific war crimes, and perhaps other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, existed in customary international law at the time or not. This, however, is an acceptable
price to pay for the opportunity to place situations in which atrocities have
occurred within or in relation to U.N. Member States within the jurisdiction of the ICC by Security Council referral.

C.

Challenge to Broad PersonalJurisdiction in Situations Referred by the
Security Council-The 'jurisdictionratione temporis" Provision

One could read the 'Jurisdiction ratione temporis" provision of article
11 to suggest that the Court's personal jurisdiction is no greater in cases
referred by the Security Council than in other cases. Section 2 reads: "If a
State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court
may exercise its jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after
the entry into force of this Statute for that State, unless that State has
made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3." Matters referred by
the Security Council are not treated differently by the text of this
provision.'3 l1
Imagine the following situation. A person who is a national of a nonParty State acted solely on the territory of that State and is accused of a
crime in the Court following a referral by the Security Council. The State
then becomes a party to the ICC Statute. The accused could argue that
329. See id. arts. 22, 24 (speaking of persons not being "criminally responsible" for acts not criminal when committed). Both articles are contained in the
ICC Statute characterized under General Principles of Criminal Law rather than
Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law. For a discussion of personal jurisdiction provisions appearing in ICC Statute Part 3, see supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
330. For further discussion of the distinction between customary international crimes and crimes that are merely treaty based, see supra Part V(B) (2).
331. By contrast, section 2 of article 12, restricting the Court's authority to
exercise jurisdiction unless certain States have become parties to the Statute or
accepted the Court's authority by declaration, is preceded by a clause limiting its
effect to situations referred by a party State or investigated by the Prosecutor
proprio Motu.
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the Court has no authority to prosecute and punish him or her because of
this provision. Such a person might claim that article 11 indicates an intent not to exercise jurisdiction over a person unless a State with a relevant
connection to that person has become a party to the Statute at the time of
the alleged crime or has made a declaration of acceptance ofjurisdiction.
One could even imagine a State becoming a party to the ICC Statute (without making a declaration), in order to immunize its citizens from the jurisdiction of the Court, given a literal reading of this article.
This argument should be rejected. Indeed, it is absurd, given the purposes of the Security Council referral scheme. This provision was not intended to allow States to protect their citizens from the Court's
jurisdiction in this manner. Even a literal reading of a treaty should be
33
rejected if it leads to an absurd result.
Instead, this article should be read in the context of all the jurisdiction provisions of the ICC Statute, as well as in light of the Statute's object
and purposes. 33 3 The articles concerning the Court's jurisdiction demonstrate that Security Council referrals were designed to substitute for the
creation of ad hoc tribunals. 3 34 The Prosecutor and the Court need to be
able to consider allegations that crimes were committed before the referral. The clearly expressed intent of the articles on referrals is to allow the
Court to exercise jurisdiction even when relevant States are not parties to
the ICC Statute.3 35 Article 11 therefore should be read to apply only to
situations referred to the Court by a State Party to the ICC Statute or a
situation investigated by the Prosecutor proprio Motu.
VII.

CONCIUSION

Doctrines ofjurisdiction to adjudicate and jurisdiction to prescribe in
criminal law developed in international law and national legal systems
long before the advent of international criminal courts. The existence of
these new tribunals means the creation of a new form of jurisdiction over
persons: jurisdiction of an international entity that is not a State. From
the creation of the ICTY onward, this new entity is the modern international organization.
This development has necessarily brought changes in the way both
jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate are handled. One
can see in this change evolution of the traditional jurisdictional law,
brought about through fairly traditional means of developing interna332. See VCOLT, supra note 45, art. 32(b).
333. See id. art. 31. The sentence in the text represents something of a continental approach to the use of the entire text of a treaty and its object and pturpose
to illuminate the meaning of a specific provision.
334. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 12, 13.
335. For the obligation of U.N. Member States to cooperate with the ICC after a Security Council referral, see supra note 271.
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tional law. One can also see a continual growth in the concern for individual human rights in the organic law of these new tribunals.
The ICC is now being brought into existence. One can see in its Statute a continuing evolution of jurisdictional doctrine and the way international criminal law is made.
The limits on the personal jurisdiction of the ICC are substantial in
the case of referrals made by States that are parties to the ICC Statute, and
in the case of situations investigated by the Prosecutor proprio motu. In the
case of situations referred to the Court by the U.N. Security Council, the
limitations on personal jurisdiction are much less, and in fact may be
hypothetical.
It is worth setting out these limitations, because some of them go to
the principle of nulla crimen sine lege-there is no crime in the absence of
(applicable) law when and where an act is committed-a fundamental notion ofjustice, which exists both in the ICC Statute and in customary international law. Admitting these limitations helps harmonize the ICC Statute
with the law of international organizations and general international law.
These limitations will not, in fact, prevent the prosecution of the most
serious crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Observing the limits of jurisdiction both to prescribe and to adjudicate should assist the Court, when it begins operations, in punishing and
deterring the most serious international crime without entangling itself in
claims that it is overreaching its proper boundaries.
It is also worth setting out these limits because they describe principles of international criminal law that apply to all international criminal
tribunals. These principles should be observed when and if other tribunals are created. These may include joint national-international tribunals
aimed both at punishing serious violations of international humanitarian
law and at building the judiciary of an area that has been wracked by violence. They may also include regional international arrangements to deal
with multinational crime including money laundering and drug
trafficking.
The ICC Statute may not mark a revolutionary moment in the way
international law is made. This should not diminish its usefulness in punishing and ultimately preventing genocide and other horrors. Its non-revolutionary nature may in fact be one of its great strengths.
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